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Since the early 1990s we have witnessed a significant decline in the number of 
ongoing armed conflicts and at the same time a dramatic increase in the number of 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. It is clear that 
DDR has become part and parcel of peace processes and peacekeeping operations. 
Research	on	the	subject	matter	is	thriving,	and	is	rich	with	valuable	insights	and	anec-
dotes.	Meanwhile,	 it	 remains	 unclear	 as	 to	what	 extent	 insights	 derived	 from	 case	
studies are possible to generalize across the spectrum of DDR programs. If we are to 
learn lessons from previous DDR programs, and if lessons learned studies are to be 
meaningful, then we have to assume that the insights and anecdotes are not unique, 
but applicable to many, if not most, of the DDR programs. Thus, the insights would 
need to form a larger pattern of commonalities across cases. It is therefore important 
to complement the case studies that are characterized by depth, with the scope of system-
atic evaluations that incorporate a large number of cases that make it possible to deter-
mine whether there are in fact any general patterns.
As the practice of DDR has matured and become prevalent, and as research has 
accumulated, it has become possible and timely to take stock of achievements and 
challenges. This thought-provoking report reviews the area and its evolution. It high-
lights	achievements	and	challenges,	 is	rich	with	 illustrative	case	examples,	and	sug-
gests a series of fruitful and practical solutions towards better evaluations of DDR 
programs. One insight of the authors’ is that evaluations of DDR programs need to 
move beyond its focus on performance (that is, whether all parts of a DDR program 
were implemented) and instead focus on impact in terms of building peace. This, we 
 Ann Bernes
Director of Department for Policy, Research and Development
Birger Heldt
 Director of Research
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concur, applies also to evaluations of peacekeeping operations in general. A second 
insight is that we need to look more carefully into the micro-foundations or causal 
pathways	of	DDR,	in	terms	of	exactly	why	and	how	DDR	can	contribute	to	peace.	
This is an important issue since it carries large policy implications for how DDR pro-
grams should be designed to have the largest possible impact. A third insight is that 
DDR programs should be designed to make it easier to carry out systematic evalua-
tions. Overall, the report suggests policy relevant elements of a new research agenda 
and tools for evaluating DDR programs.
This is an important publication for scholars and practitioners interested in the 
subject	matter.	It	 is	yet	another	example	of	the	output	of	the	 international	research	
working groups created and financed by the Academy. These groups have been creat-
ed	to	promote	research,	develop	research	agendas	and	offer	a	forum	for	exchange	of	
ideas, findings and networking. Overall, the groups attempt to promote systematic, 
rigorous and broad comparative studies, including large-scale field surveys, which are 
of policy relevance. The ultimate goal is to improve and inform policy. We are pleased 
to offer this report to the policy and scholarly communities.
This study has been financed by the Academy. The responsibility for the contents 
rests with the authors. 
Ann Bernes Birger Heldt
Director Director of Research
Department for Policy,  
Research and Development
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1 For as long as	warfare	has	existed	societies	have	confronted	the	problem	of	
what to do with combatants once hostilities cease.1 Following international wars 
there	is	little	concern	that	ex-combatants	may	threaten	the	peace,	either	between	
the	states	or	domestically,	although	ex-combatants	may	pose	a	problem	for	public	
order. But when civil wars end, the presence of armed elements with few alterna-
tives to practicing their violent skill-sets poses a threat to consolidating gains 
made in peace processes near their conclusion, or to the stability of an already-
concluded peace. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) pro-
grams have developed as a response by the international community to the per-
ceived risk of a return to violence if former combatants are not rehabilitated and 
reintegrated into society. 
2 DDR programs involving the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and other 
international actors date to the late 1980s, and have grown rapidly in number and 
scope.	The	appendix	contains	tables	listing	the	presence	of	DDR	programs	during	
or following civil wars for the 1979 to 2006 period. We break them down by 
whether	external	assistance	was	provided	to	the	program.	In	all,	DDR	programs	
were implemented in a total of 51 civil wars that were active during the period 
1979 to 2006. If we consider only civil wars that ended from 1994 on (or were 
ongoing during that time) and for which the DDR process also occurred, we are 
left with DDR programs related to 38	 post-civil	war	 contexts.	This	 indicates	 a	




3 Why are DDR programs increasingly used after civil war? The impetus for at 
least the initial round of DDR programs in the 1979 to 2006 period came from 
sovereign government donors to World Bank programs who wanted to know 
“how do we deal with these people [the combatants]?”3 This practical concern 
dominated the early debates in designing DDR programs, while a more analyti-
cal	examination	of	the	goals	came	later	on.	DDR	programs	were	almost	immedi-
ately perceived as good practice and donors were eager to engage in them as policy 
analyses from the mid-1990s began to articulate a host of ways in which interna-
tional	actors	could	expect	to	see	their	investments	in	DDR	efforts	produce	good	
outcomes, such as stability and prosperity in post-conflict countries.4 Very quickly, 
DDR came to be seen as integral to a successful transition to peace and vital to 
promoting long-term stability, security, and economic development.5
4	 Many	untested	assumptions	went	into	the	elaboration	of	the	potential	effects	of	
DDR programs. These assumptions, and the consequent belief that DDR pro-
grams are essential in helping to prevent war-recurrence in post-conflict situa-
tions, are at the heart of current international aid practices, the policy literature, 
and most of the academic literature. This makes a complete evaluation of the 
potential of DDR programs to accomplish their stated goals with respect to 
peacebuilding both urgent and all the more surprising in its absence to date. 
5 In this report, we provide an assessment of DDR from a social-scientific stand-
point. First, in this introduction, we summarize the research questions that stud-
ies on DDR in the policy and academic worlds want to answer. These questions 
fall into two categories: DDR programs’ effectiveness in achieving their various 
goals, and how best to implement programs to achieve these goals. Second, we 
review the policy and academic literatures on DDR by the topics singled out in the 
introduction. Third, in a methodological review, we ask, how we can evaluate the 
effects of DDR programs? Among the questions about DDR programs currently 
being asked in the literature, which questions are hard, if not impossible, to 
answer? Are the right data being collected and appropriate methods used in impact 
evaluations of DDR programs? Fourth, we conclude by drawing on our analyti-
cal review to provide an agenda for future research. We identify ways that the lit-
erature can move forward and draw out the implications of our discussion for the 
broader literature on peacebuilding interventions.
1.1 Limitations in the Evalution of DDR Programs
6 Despite the widespread use of DDR programs and the strong belief in policy circles 
that they are effective, no study to date has been able to isolate and measure the 
impact of DDR programs on peace processes. Typically, however, such studies 
claim success in a broader sense: if the DDR program is implemented and there is 
disar m ament, demobilization, a nd r eintegr ation progr ams
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no return to armed conflict in the country, then a causal connection is drawn 
between the two. But this approach is problematic, since given the presence of 
many confounding factors the DDR program is not necessarily connected to the 
outcome observed. 
7 A few studies have taken a cross-country comparative perspective to assess the 
effectiveness of DDR programs. A landmark study by the World Bank (1993) was 
written too soon after the start of several large DDR programs and so it was not 
possible to fully evaluate their impact. That study pointed to the need to build 
program evaluation into each DDR program and identified some of the difficul-
ties encountered in proper evaluation of DDR programs. It noted that there was a 
lack	of	adequate	information	on	DDR	programs	and	that	existing	studies	were	not	
able to address the counterfactual of what would have happened if a DDR program 
had not been used in a given peace process (see World Bank 1993:18-19). 
8 A common way to assess the impact of DDR programs is to give a before-and-
after picture of program participants. Some studies claim success for DDR pro-
grams using this approach, where the outcome might be the duration of produc-
tive	employment	for	project	participants	or	some	other	outcome	measured	at	the	
individual level. It is, however, difficult to link broader policy outcomes—such as 
war or its absence—to individual level outcomes; and it is even difficult to accu-
rately measure individual level outcomes, let alone keep program participants 
under observation for long periods in most postwar settings. A World Bank study 
(1993:xii)	 reported	that	five	years	after	 the	end	of	 the	program,	almost	40% of 
those participating in cooperatives had dropped out and only 28% of part icipants 
had found employment outside the military and public sector, with 17% remain-
ing unemployed. These statistics do not give us a good sense of the program’s 
impact, since for such an evaluation we would require a comparison to a properly 
selected control group of non-participants that is observed over the same period. 
9 An even larger limitation with the policy literature is that many—if not most—of 
the conclusions about the determinants of DDR program effectiveness are too 
vague	or	state	rather	obvious	points.	For	example,	one	frequently	reads	that	DDR	
programs will be effective if there is “commitment by all concerned parties” 
(World Bank 1993:12), or if “donor countries are partners in the design of DDR 
programs,” if “the caliber of UN staff working on DDR is high, and “if the NGO 
community is utilized more by the UN to deliver DDR support.”6 Spear’s (2002) 
discussion of the factors that influence the effectiveness of DDR programs 
includes some of the usual suspects, such as the implementation environment, the 
capacities and resources of those implementing the programs, and the monitoring 
and verification of treaty implementation. Along the same lines, Colletta’s (1999) 
review of World Bank-funded DDR programs find that keys to the success of a 
i n t roduc t ion
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DDR program are “political will,” “good assessments of former combatants’ basic 
needs and socio-economic characteristics,” and “institutional transparency with 
monitoring.” It is clear—some would say obvious—that if staff are poorly trained, 
if no resources reach the target population, if program officers do not know the 
needs of the target population, or if donors back out of supporting the program, 
any assistance strategy is likely to fail. Beyond this, however, do we have impact 
evaluations of DDR programs that can make clear policy recommendations for 
how	to	organize	these	programs	in	such	a	way	as	to	maximize	their	chances	of	
success? In most of the literature that we reviewed, we found little evidence of 
systematic assessments. Rather, most studies make sweeping statements based on 
limited and rather ambiguous evidence. 
10 Perhaps the most constructive element of evaluations and technical reports on 
DDR programs is their conclusions about important technical aspects of these 
programs, leading to several “lessons learned” that are widely shared in policy 
studies across different organizations. Some of these appear obvious, as we men-
tioned above. Careful profiling of the former combatants through socio-eco-
nomic surveys is thought to allow better targeting of reintegration programs 
(UN DPKO 1999).7 Other lessons are perhaps less obvious, including the follow-
ing: Demobilization and discharge should be done quickly to avoid long periods 
of encampment, which increase the risks to security;8 cash entitlements are often 
preferable	to	in-kind	assistance	as	they	are	more	flexible;	participants	should	be	
separated into groups and subgroups depending on their desired occupation after 
reinsertion into society and the reintegration program should target each group 
separately; and a central coordinating (civilian) agency is often critical for smooth 
and efficient program implementation.9 
11 The main conclusions that we reach from reviewing this literature are that (a) 
what we know (or think we know) about DDR programs refers to implementa-
tion issues and technical details; (b) many best practices essentially reflect com-
mon sense and are not based on solid empirical assessments of a wide array of 
programs evaluated under similar conditions; and (c) there is a large conceptual 
gap in understanding the relationship between DDR effectiveness at the individual 
level and the broader impact of these programs on the risk of war recurrence. 
1.2 Refocusing
12 A particularly striking aspect of research on DDR is that, in its narrow focus on 
implementation issues, it often loses sight of the fundamental research questions 
that	should	motivate	it.	Consequently,	existing	studies	of	DDR	programs	often	
cannot say much about the effect of these programs on peacebuilding after civil 
war. The field, at its heart, concerns the stability of peace after civil war, and the 
disar m ament, demobilization, a nd r eintegr ation progr ams
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i n t roduc t ion
links between conflict (or prospective conflict) and economic development. In 
what follows, we re-focus attention on these issues and on the need to investigate 
whether DDR programs indeed help to enhance stability and development in a 
post-conflict environment. Ultimately, this is what practitioners want these pro-
grams to do.
13 Organizations working in the field of DDR view these programs as fundamen-
tally multi-dimensional, with wide-ranging intended effects, but nevertheless with 
a primary emphasis on security. The Final Report of the Stockholm Initiative on 
Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR), under the auspices of the 
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Sweden,	reflects	this	understanding:	“The	SIDDR	
…defends a conception of DDR which aims to stabilise the post conflict situa-
tion, while at the same time keeping the long-term peace-building agenda in 
mind” (SIDDR 2006:14).10 In this report, we discuss four distinct goals that are 
commonly attributed to DDR processes:





14 We disaggregate the potential contributions of DDR to peace into topical areas in 
this	way	so	that	we	can	expose	the	various	research	questions	they	imply.	We	also	
discuss two issues concerning the implementation of DDR programs, and simi-
larly indicate what research questions arise from them: how should elements of 
these programs be sequenced; and, could programs have adverse effects? Then, in 
light of fairly inconclusive empirical evidence on the effectiveness of DDR pro-
grams to date, in a section on methodology we look at how analyses of these 
questions might be more precisely conducted in the future and how to achieve 





2.1 War Recurrence and the Conflict-Development Nexus
15 The chief concern in a post-conflict environment is preventing the resump-
tion of hostilities. DDR programs are thought to reduce the risk of a war recur-





the military; and 
•	 helping	governments	realize	peace	dividends.	
 The links between these outcomes and a lower risk of war recurrence rest on ideas 
about the individual-level opportunity costs of war, and bargaining models 
emphasizing the importance of overcoming commitment problems to end conflict.
16 At the micro level, the “R” (Reintegration) in DDR programs is thought to influ-
ence the overall risk of war recurrence by enhancing the economic opportunities 
of former combatants.11 This view is consistent with currently popular economic 
models	of	civil	war,	according	to	which	one	would	expect	the	risk	of	war	to	be	
greatest where the economic opportunity costs of war are lower.12 The “Ds” help 
in other ways: through “micro-disarmament,” DDR programs can reduce the 
prevalence of small arms and make a rapid re-mobilization for violence harder.13 
Similarly, the risk of recurrence can be reduced through DDR program-achieved 
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demobilization, which severs the ties between former combatants and the com-
mand structure.14 At the macro level, one mechanism through which DDR pro-
grams are supposed to contribute to peace is through reductions in military 
expenditure,	following	the	restructuring	and	downsizing	of	the	military,	which	
should lead to greater economic growth,15 and consequently a reduced risk of civil 
war down the road. Disarmament also serves a symbolic purpose (signifying the 
end of war) and tests the parties’ commitment to the peace process, thus building 
their confidence in it and each other.16 
17 The broader literature on the recurrence of civil wars supports the plausibility of 
these	conjectures	concerning	the	possible	role	of	DDR	in	peacebuilding.	Doyle	
and Sambanis (2000, 2006) find evidence that multidimensional UN peace oper-
ations substantially increase the likelihood that post-conflict peace will be 
sustained (see also Fortna 2004).17 Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) show a corre-
lation between power-sharing agreements and more durable peace settlements 
(see also Hoddie and Hartzell [2003]). A causal connection is hard to establish, 
although there are several plausible mechanisms, including the perception that 
such outcomes are more democratic and the confidence-building effects of power-
sharing. Two types of power-sharing are the integration of former warring par-
ties into the institutions of government, and the integration of their forces into 
the national military, both of which can be facilitated through DDR programs.18 
18 Due to the emphasis that many theories of war recurrence place on economic 
considerations, the potential effect of DDR programs on the economy, and there-
by indirectly on the likelihood of a return to war is also of primary importance. 
On the part of governments, the motivation for initiating DDR programs is often 
directly linked to the promise of a post-war “peace dividend.” Growth can be 
stimulated	 by	 reducing	 government	 military	 expenditures,	 thereby	 allowing	
increased government spending on development initiatives or in other productive 
areas. If reduced military spending allows governments to cut their budget defi-
cits, this may also stimulate the economy through lower inflation, which in turn 
will reduce unemployment and encourage investment. Not only might govern-
ment	expenditures	shift	to	productive	activities,	but	the	demobilized	ex-combat-
ants, if employed, would bring more human capital to bear in these activities as 
well (World Bank 1993; Colletta et. al. 1996a; Kingma 2002). However, despite 
the optimism brought by conflicts ending, countries may not see these “savings” 
materialize to the degree anticipated (Kingma 2002:182). 
19 Broadly speaking, the literature on war recurrence provides prima facie support 
for	the	conjecture	that	DDR	has	a	positive	effect	on	reducing	the	likelihood	of	
renewed conflict. The difficulty is that the mechanisms through which DDR is 
posited to have this effect receive either much less support than their prominence 
disar m ament, demobilization, a nd r eintegr ation progr ams
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in	thinking	on	DDR	would	suggest,	or	are	not	tested	directly	by	existing	studies.	
DDR literature emphasizes individual opportunity costs, and how short-term 
income	assistance	to	ex-combatants	being	discharged	and	longer-term	assistance	
to improve their prospects of employment mitigate the risk that these individuals 
will return to bearing arms. However, theoretical reasoning and emerging evi-
dence	in	empirical	studies	suggests	that	opportunity	costs	do	not	explain	recruit-
ment of individuals into rebel organizations or the incidence of conflict (see end-
note 12). A second mechanism, that of DDR assisting inter-group confidence 
building, fares better. But the DDR literature does not spell out in detail how 
programs contribute to confidence building other than to raise this possibility 
with respect to the disarmament and demobilization phases. These issues under-
score the need for empirical evaluation of the presumed effects of DDR and atten-
tion to evaluating whether the proposed mechanisms leading to those effects do 
indeed play out.
2.2 Violence and Crime Prevention
20 Continued violence following war, even if isolated or at low enough levels not to 
constitute resumption of the war, or even if wholly apolitical, may pose a threat 
to stability. In post-conflict settings where government institutions are weakened 
by war, violence may continue as private firms proliferate to fill the security vacuum 
left by the government (Colletta et. al. 1996a:v). Violent actions that were part of 
the war might continue after the war ends, but in the post-conflict period be 
termed criminal, or disassociated from politics (Clark 1996:29–30; Taylor and 
Jennings 2004: 7).19 
21 Criminal violence after civil war may be more likely if the parties involved in the 
war attracted individuals motivated more by the opportunity for quick profit 
through criminal activity and less by their ideological commitment to the political 
purpose of the war. However, postwar criminal violence need not result solely 
from	the	prevalence	of	such	“bad”	types	of	ex-combatants.	Anyone	might	turn	to	
crime	in	the	absence	of	viable	alternatives	for	generating	income.	Indeed,	ex-com-
batants might be more prone to such behavior given their greater familiarity with 
weapons and violence as compared to the average civilian (Bank 1993:72; Collier 
1994; Kingma 1997:12).	More	generally,	widespread	access	to	weapons	may	sim-
ply be associated with higher levels of crime (Carbonnier 1998:18; World Bank 
1999:§3.7; Gleichman et. al. 2004), especially in the presence of “the culture of 
violence inherited from war” (World Bank 1999:§1.2). The type of weaponry 
available may also pose a challenge to the government in its attempts to fight 
crime and provide security, as “[i]n many cases police and civilians are 
literally ‘outgunned’ by former combatants and criminals wielding military-style 
weapons”	(Muggah	2005a:241). 
lit er at ur e r ev iew
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22 Social opportunities also play an important role in risk factors for crime and vio-
lence.	 Community	 stigmatization	 of	 ex-combatants	 may	 pigeon-hole	 them	 as	
deviants, pushing them into lives of crime (Colletta, et. al. 1996a:24). Or, crime 
and	violence	may	have	an	expressive	function	for	ex-combatants,	who	use	it	as	an	
avenue to convey their “frustrat[ion] at their inability to reintegrate” into society 
and dissatisfaction with the assistance given them by the government to do so 
(Spencer 1997:14). 
23 In theory, DDR programs may help mitigate the risk of postwar violence through 
their effect on the opportunity-cost mechanism (in the same way that they can 
help reduce the risk of war recurrence). Reintegration programs may improve the 
economic	opportunities	of	ex-combatants,	whether	through	job	training	(increas-
ing their human capital), the provision of start-up capital for small businesses, or 
simply cash or material transfers. Disarmament is also thought to play an impor-
tant role. The destruction of weaponry might have a symbolic effect and help 
push individuals away from war-time mindsets that legitimized violence. Thus, 
many practitioners insist on public displays of the destruction of weapons, even if 
governments will not actually destroy all weapons collected through disarma-
ment programs but instead wish to stockpile them or distribute them to the secu-
rity	forces.	Laurance	and	Meek	(1996:85) make reference to the “supposed psy-
chological value” that destroying weapons by burning them in a public place had 
during a 1992–1993 Nicaraguan program. Tuareg rebels participated in a 1996 
ceremony	in	Mail	in	which	3,000 weapons were burned, marking the official end 
of the war. The event, dubbed la Flamme de la Paix, became a model for other 
countries	 involved	 in	 post-conflict	DDR	pro	cesses	 and	 disarmament	 exercises	
(Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998; Bah 2004; Florquin and Pézard 2005).
24 If buy-back programs for weapons are implemented, disarmament could also act 
to reduce the likelihood of violence and crime simply by the economic benefits it 
provides	to	ex-combatants	with	weapons	to	sell	(although	this	would	depend	on	
the prices offered under the buy-back scheme, which would have to be above 
market prices for this claim to hold). However, the most frequently-made argument 
about disarmament is that it reduces violence and crime simply by reducing the 
number of weapons in circulation, particularly in the case of small arms; no further 
logic is specified.
25 Arguments about the ability of DDR programs to reduce postwar crime rest on 
insights from a sizeable literature in economics and law that uses a model of 
behavior in which improving individuals’ economic opportunities is associated 
with reductions in the level of crime.20 If crime is motivated by the paucity of 
profitable	non-expropriative	economic	activity	for	ex-combatants,	then	in	theory	
several components of DDR programs can help reduce post-conflict crime and 




psychology and criminology on the causes of crime and violence from an empir-
ical standpoint.21 
26 Empirically-based arguments that DDR programs can assist in reducing post-
conflict crime and violence are often presented in the negative. That is, numerous 
accounts point to the involvement of former combatants in post-conflict crime 
and violent activities, and suggest that failures in DDR programs are to blame for 
the prevalence of these problems. News reports on post-conflict El Salvador, 
South	Africa,	Mozambique,	Guatemala,	Liberia,	Aceh,	and	Burundi,	among	others	
(spanning the early 1990s to date), are typical in this respect.22 The literature on 
DDR also makes many hypothetical statements concerning the link between a 
failure	to	reintegrate	ex-combatants	and	increased	risk	of	crime	or	violence.	For	
example,	the	World	Bank’s	2004 proposal for a DDR program in Burundi noted 
that “failure to achieve reintegration can lead to crime and insecurity” (World 
Bank 2004:64). Some reports do conclude that a lack of crime in areas in which 
ex-combatants	resettled	during	DDR	is	suggestive	of	some	degree	of	preventative	
success on the part of the programs (Colletta et. al. [1996:12, 192–3, 277–8] refer 
to such outcomes for Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda).23 
27 The implication is that, should DDR be conducted properly, crime and violence 
will	be	reduced.	This,	however,	is	a	conjecture	that	is	never	proven	in	impact	evalu-
ations of DDR programs. Similar accounts of crime and violence in post-conflict 
settings without DDR programs are also often used to suggest that, if a DDR 
program had been in place, this could have led to reductions in crime levels. 
However, since we observe surges in crime in virtually all post-conflict settings, 
analysts must at least leave open the possibility that DDR programs may not be 
sufficient to reduce crime and violence after civil war and that some increases, 
locally or nationally, may be the inevitable by-product of the transition. While 
proper implementation of DDR programs might help, DDR programs are unlike-
ly to include the mechanisms necessary to contain crime in all postwar societies 
at the micro and macro level. Anti-crime effects of DDR programs at the micro 
level (i.e. locally, at the village or community level) may, in fact, depend on other 
factors that are beyond their scope, of the DDR program, such as the directives 
issued by national elites to local elites to keep order, the degree to which there are 
shared beliefs that the transition is stable throughout the country, and so on. 
28 In sharp contrast to our argument here, DDR evaluations tend to attribute poor 
implementation of the DDR program to poor security outcomes at the national 
level,	while	also	taking	good	security	outcomes,	where	those	exist,	as	evidence	of	
the program’s success. An evaluation of the DDR program in Sierra Leone provides 




families and therefore were less likely to engage in illegal activities” (Tesfamichael 
et. al. 2004: 82). The argument here is that DDR program activities were the key 
determinant	of	the	crime	rate,	but	this	is	a	conjecture	that	is	at	best	simplistic	giv-
en the fact that the causes of crime are not well understood in the empirical liter-
ature. DDR evaluations on the effects on crime must make more modest claims 
given the presence of many confounding factors that are typically not considered 
in	 these	 studies.	 For	 example,	 in	many	 post-conflict	 settings	 there	 have	 been	
changes in the deployment of police and security forces, which may well have a 
very direct effect on local patterns and levels of crime.24 
29 Claims concerning the effectiveness of the disarmament components of DDR 
programs are also not robustly verified, although they may very well be accurate. 
One might look at the vast literature on gun control in the United States for clues 
on the connection between violence levels and the prevalence of guns. There are 
obvious	difficulties	in	extrapolating	from	the	US	experience	to	that	of	post-war	
countries, but the US-focused literature suggests that gun laws and voluntary 
buy-back programs have been ineffective across the board at reducing crime (see 
Jacobs 2002;	Muggah	 [2005a:244] also comments on the problems of buy-back 
programs). The literature also suggests that some gun-control laws may even be 
correlated with increases in crime (see Parker 2001). As Zimring (2001:15) 
explains:	“The	evidence	that	guns	increase	the	death	from	violence	is	firm—this	
is the strong suit of the pro-control forces. The evidence that particular modest 
changes in legal regulation can make a dent in the gun violence toll is not strong. 
This is the strong suit of the anti-control partisans and skeptics.”
30 Key issues include whether any significant proportion of the total number of guns 
in circulation can be collected under these programs; and adverse effects including 
allowing criminals to sell obsolete weapons under the programs. The latter issue 
would allow purchasing of better weaponry, and disproportionately decreasing 
the number of guns in the hands of law abiding citizens relative to criminals due to 
the voluntary nature of the programs (see Parker 2001:717; Zimring 2001; Jacobs 
2002; Kopel et. al. 2004). Clearly the disarmament components of DDR programs 
may differ from voluntary gun buy-back programs, yet these are important cave-
ats that their proponents have not addressed in any detail. Kopel et. al. (2004) 
examine	 micro-disarmament	 programs	 in	 Cambodia,	 Bougainville,	 Albania,	
Panama,	Guatemala,	and	Mali,	all	taking	place	in	forms	of	post-conflict	contexts.	
They conclude that seldom do these programs reduce crime or violence in the target 
society, and that often they can increase the vulnerability of law-abiding citizens, 
particularly if disarmament, although voluntary, has a coercive aspect to it in that 
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the provision of development programs is tied conditionally to it. Furthermore, 
where disarmament programs appear to be effective, the results may in fact be 
more directly linked to other, simultaneously implemented economic develop-
ment initiatives. Although some of the literature on DDR takes note of the con-
tention that disarmament programs may have a limited effect, it continues to rec-
ommend	 their	 use	 in	 post-conflict	 situations	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Laurance	 and	 Meek	
1996).25 
31 Although the potential for DDR programs to reduce crime and violence may cer-
tainly	exist,	the	literature	to	date	does	not	provide	robust	evidence	of	DDR	pro-
grams’ effects on crime. Impressionistic accounts concerning crime rates at the 
national level shed no light on the micro-level processes that the literature on DDR 
suggests	are	at	work.	Even	somewhat	more	detailed	reporting	on	crimes	by	ex-
combatants does not establish the link. The basic problem is one of selecting the 




individuals who did not participate in it. A second useful comparison would be 
between the pre- and post-DDR period crime rates. Even if DDR participants 
were engaged in criminal activity, it could still be the case that the amount of crime 
committed by individuals in their demographic cohort is actually lower follow-
ing the DDR process than it ever was before. Finally, DDR may have had a large 
effect on reducing crime on its own, but counter vailing forces such as lack of police 
presence could cause an increase anyway. We return to these analytical issues in 
Section 3.
2.3 Civic and Political Participation
32 A recurring theme in research on civil wars is the need for social and political 
institutions to create a self-sustaining peace, not simply the absence of war and 
violence. By mitigating rather than squelching potential sources of conflict, through 
“steer[ing]	 the	 exercise	 of	 power	 in	 non-violent	 directions	 and	 [...]	 conflicts	
towards non-violent and creative [...] forms of conflict resolution,” (Galtung 
1981:151; see also Galtung 1969, 2005) it becomes possible to achieve a stable and 
long-lasting domestic peace.26 This idea is central to the concept of peacebuilding, 
conceived as efforts to stimulate self-sustaining peace (Boutrous-Ghali 1992).27 A 
large body of work cutting across sociology, political science, economics, and social 
psychology	examines	the	link	between	individual	participation	and	stable,	wel-
fare-enhancing structures. Not only are institutions that provide the opportuni-
ty and right to individual participation seen as key,28 but active individual-level par-
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ticipation and engagement is important for their continuing good performance 
(see, e.g., Putnam 1993). This is also the logic behind the emphasis Doyle and Sam-
banis (2000, 2006) place on evaluating sustained peace defined as a modicum of 
political openness in addition to the absence of violence.29 
33 Since encouraging civic and political participation is seen as an integral component 
of peacebuilding,30 it has naturally become a goal of DDR programs, if not quite 
as	explicitly	as	preventing	war	recurrence	or	reducing	post-war	violence	and	crime.	
Here, DDR programs, particularly elements of their demobilization and reinsertion 
and	reintegration	components	are	important	(the	latter	both	for	individual	ex-com-
batants and entire localities). DDR programs can influence participation by sup-
porting three mechanisms that operate on different levels: conversion of military 
groups into civilian political organizations (meso-level); skill-development and 
resource	 creation	 for	 individual	 ex-combatants	 and	 civilians	 (micro-level);	 and	
legitimization of a new post-war political order (macro-level). 
34 Incorporating opposing groups into the political system and channeling conflicts 
through it is an important step towards creating self-sustaining peace in the post-
conflict transition. DDR programs contribute to this by helping transform armed 
groups into entities that can participate non-militarily in the political and social 
life of the country. The conversion of the FLN rebel group into a political party 
during	the	DDR	process	in	Burundi	is	one	such	example	(IRIN	2009b). As one 
former	commander	 in	the	M-19 rebel group in Colombia put it: “Our original 
idea was that the people would take up arms and head to the mountains as a result 
of the general dissatisfaction with politics in the country [...] But [...] things had 
changed in Colombia. […] the country began to open up politically, which for us 
came as a great surprise. Opportunities for politics appeared that previously had 
not	existed.”31 
35 Demobilization may play a role in this process by severing the military links 
between	ex-combatants,	whether	these	are	fraternal	links	between	members	of	an	
armed group with the same status, or the hierarchical links between commanders 
and	fighters.	This	would	reduce	 the	ability	of	ex-combatants	 to	use	 the	armed	
group, or, more generally, organized force, to pursue their interests in the post-
conflict society. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether demobiliza-
tion can actually accomplish this severing of ties. Knight and Özerdem (2004:508) 
point out that how demobilization is conducted may actually reinforce such ties, 
if,	 for	 example,	 cantonment	 is	 involved.	 SIDDR	 (2006:24) takes a rather more 
sanguine view of the entire topic: “No measure or set of measures can guarantee 
that	ex-combatants	do	not	return	to	violence;	whether	because	of	their	feeling	of	
discontent or because they are called back by their commanders.” 
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36 Indeed the important element of the transformation to a political party is not 
necessarily eliminating ties between former combatants, but rather channeling 
their energies into the political system. The literature on war economies empha-
sizes that eliminating the unique influence by force of arms that armed groups 
exercise	 during	 conflict	 can	 create	 a	 severe	 threat	 to	 peace	 (since	 groups	 will	
attempt to preserve this influence) unless new opportunities for political influ-
ence	are	substituted	for	it	(Torjesen	2006:7; Nilsson 2005:48–51). Potential ave-
nues for a group to influence post-war politics include transforming it into a 
political party,32 the granting of specific positions or prerogatives in governmen-
tal institutions to it or its leaders as a form of power-sharing, and the formation of 
veterans	associations	to	represent	the	particular	interests	of	ex-combatants.	These	
types	of	incorporation	push	ex-combatants	to	operate	within	the	political	system	
and engage with it. They help to “ensure the conversion of potential spoilers into 
stakeholders”	 (Muggah	 and	 Colletta	 2009:10). Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
even failure of a former armed group as a political party can assist political incor-
poration	of	ex-combatants,	who	are	therefore	better	off	participating	in	politics	
without	reference	to	their	identiy	as	members	of	that	group	(see	Mitton	[2009] on 
the case of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone).
37 Groups or their leaders can also be stakeholders in ways that are less constructive 
from	 a	 development	 perspective,	 for	 example	 by	 using	 privileged	 positions	 in	
govern ment to benefit from corrupt practices. Even so, this is still a potentially 
stabilizing factor because the continued functioning of political institutions is 
now	salient	to	these	actors	(Torjesen	2006:15).33 All in all, the inclusive politics 
resulting from the political incorporation of former armed groups can reduce the 
risk of a return to war, and provide the basis for a stable, lasting peace (Porto et. al. 
2007:69). Without it, new conflicts could easily arise or old ones be revived 
(Gleichman et. al. 2004:68). 
38 DDR programs can also enhance participation through their effects on individual 
ex-combatants	and	the	broader	civilian	community.	The	reinsertion	and	reinte-
gration components of the programs typically start with the provision of cash, 
food aid and other basic personal items to create a short-term “transitional safe-
ty-net.” They also offer assistance with education, vocational training, employ-
ment creation, advice and counseling concerning employment and income-gener-
ating	projects,	funding	(credit	or	grants)	for	projects,	and	land	distribution.	These	
elements	 are	 complemented	by	“orientation[s]”	 for	 ex-combatants	 “focused	on	
making	the	ex-combatants	understand	the	responsibilities	of	an	individual	in	a	
civil and peaceful society” (Colletta 1996:74) and “community sensitization” for 
civilians	 in	 localities	where	ex-combatants	will	resettle	 to	make	them	aware	of	
and	responsive	to	the	challenges	ex-combatants	face	during	reintegration	(World	
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Bank 1993; Colletta 1996;  Spencer 1997; World Bank 2002;	Michaels	2006). The 
elements	directed	solely	at	ex-combatants	enhance	their	human	capital	and	help	
them improve their economic situation; they also provide civic knowledge. The 
components relating to the communities (“community sensitization”) and 
employment/income-generating-related	 activities	 help	 foster	 ties	 between	 ex-
combatants	 and	 civilians	 through	 reintroduction	 of	 ex-combatants	 into	 local	
society	and	social	organizations.	Taken	together,	this	provides	ex-combatants,	as	
well as civilians, with a set of resources likely to increase individual-level political 
participation. Specifically, individuals with more available free time and more 
involvement in social, religious, or employment organizations have higher degrees 
of participation in political activities like voting and engagement with the politi-
cal process (see Brady et. al. 1995).
39 At their broadest, beyond trying to foster the active engagement of groups and 
individuals	with	society	and	politics,	DDR	programs	aim	to	change	the	way	ex-
combatants and civilians view governance processes. This line of inquiry is under-
theorized, so here we sketch out a plausible logic consistent with the intuitions of 
the	extant	literature,	rather	than	drawing	on	that	literature	explicitly.
40 We view basic perceptions of the (in this case) post-war government as a distinct 
form of participation in the political system, which we term passive participation. 
The development of a legitimate governing authority following a period of civil 
war is crucial for political stability without violence (Orr 2002), given that the 
war was characterized by armed challenges to government and represented a fail-
ure of the previous government to provide even basic order.34 A large literature in 
social	psychology	examines	individual	compliance	with	authority,	and	in	partic-
ular	non-instrumental	explanations	of	compliance.	Tyler	(2006a) summarizes the 
findings of this research program: fair procedures are at the core of individual 
beliefs	 about	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 authority,	 with	 procedural	 justice	 creating	 the	
legitimacy that forms the basis of compliance. The instrumental calculation of 
the	costs	of	failure	to	comply	with	authority	in	specific	instances	does	not	explain	
compliant or noncompliant behavior. It follows that DDR programs may play a 
role in fostering stability in a post-war setting by stimulating passive participa-
tion,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 can	 encourage	 procedural	 justice	 and	 thereby	
strengthen belief in the legitimacy of the government. This stability is more than 
the sum of individual-level beliefs about legitimacy; it is enhanced by a macro-
level	attribute	of	the	political	system,	namely	the	extent	to	which	its	legitimacy	is	
widespread across the population (see Tyler 2006b:380).
41 DDR programs might work in a number of ways to enhance governmental legiti-
macy.	As	legitimacy	derives	from	procedural	justice,	or	the	perceived	fairness	of	
not only the actions but the operating mechanisms of government, the way in 
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which policies are selected during a post-conflict period, not merely which policies 
are selected, is significant. DDR programs can contribute to transparency of 
procedures particularly when it comes to policies towards former combatants 
and the post-conflict transition more generally. In addition to clarifying how 
these policies come to be selected (and how they are implemented), DDR pro-
grams can increase local participation in post-conflict policy-making by provid-
ing forums for citizens and local leaders to voice their opinions on post-conflict 
policies and have those opinions be heard by policy makers. DDR programs can 
facilitate	exchange	of	 information	between	authorities,	ex-combatants	and	citi-
zens. This is particularly important given the presence of pervasive mistrust in 
post-conflict	settings.	Some	ex-combatants	might	be	dissatisfied	with	the	bene-
fits awarded to them during DDR, but if they conclude that the process was pro-
cedurally fair, they may be induced to view the government as legitimate and 
refrain from agitating against it. Additionally, DDR programs can serve to help 
legitimate the peace process as a whole, by creating transparency as to how that 
process played out and by assuring local constituencies that their interests are 
being taken into account, even if specific outcomes are not always in their favor. 
Initiatives in DDR programs designed to increase responsiveness to local con-
cerns and enhance local participation, sometimes termed “local ownership,” are 
clearly	important	in	this	regard	(see,	for	example,	Muggah	2005b).
42 Enhancing political participation in a variety of ways in post-conflict settings is 
important in generating stability and peaceful outcomes over the long-run. By 
being	explicit	about	the	potential	of	DDR	programs	to	enhance	participation,	our	
aim is to set the stage for more careful assessments of these claims. 
2.4 Healing Wartime Traumas
43 The severe victimization, hardships and losses endured by civilians (and combat-
ants) during civil wars constitute a profound trauma with long-lasting effects.35 
Wartime trauma is problematic not only from the standpoint of psychological 
welfare, but especially because of its consequences for post-war society, econom-
ic development, and potentially the risk of violence and war recurrence.36 For 
example,	without	treatment,	detrimental	effects	on	the	psychological	and	social	
development of children suffering from war-related mental distress may not be 
resolved (Kumar 1997: 23). As Neuner and Elbert (2007)	summarize,	“Mental	ill-
ness	reduces	psychological	functioning	on	all	levels.	Consequently,	a	major	impact	
on the economic development of the war-affected region, as well as on the contin-
uation	of	conflict	is	to	be	expected”	given	the	“substantial	body	of	epidemi	o	logical	
research, which has consistently shown that mental disorders become common in 
populations affected by war and conflict.” 
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44	 Although	recent	studies	have	uncovered	a	positive	relationship	between	exposure	
to wartime violence and post-war politcal particpation by both civilians (Bellows 
and	Miguel	2009)	and	ex-combatants	(Blattman	2009),	traumatic	experiences	dur-
ing conflict may severely undermine inter-personal and communal trust, leading 
to	 the	erosion	of	social	capital	and	difficulties	 in	rebuilding	 it	 (Maynard	1997; 
Baingana et. al. 2005), and to increased polarization (Shewfelt 2009). Loss of fam-
ily	 can	 create	 formidable	obstacles	 to	 ex-combatant	 reintegration,	 since	 this	 is	
typically assisted by support from kin and provision of a home environment.37 
War may also lead to mental disorders among combatants and non-combatants 
alike, particularly Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). War-related mental 
illness can limit individuals’ ability to work (DelVecchio et. al. 2007:5), and there 
is evidence that the more severely former combatants suffer from PTSD, the less 
likely it is that they will secure full-time employment (Smith et. al. 2005).	More	
generally,	ex-combatants	may	“find	it	difficult	to	take	independent	initiatives	and	
to cope with the ordinary demands of civilian life” (Ball 1997).	Exposure	to	or	
participation in violence during war can also produce pathological behavior in 
the	post-conflict	period,	leading	primarily	ex-combatants	but	potentially	others	
to engage in inter-personal violence. The potential for wartime and combat trauma 
to spill over into life after war is greater if individuals suffer from mental disorders 
due	to	exposure	to	violence.38 A study of northern Uganda found that respond-
ents suffering from depression or PTSD were more likely than others to “identify 
violent means as a way to achieve peace”, indicating a link between war-related 
trauma and a more pronounced desire for retribution (Vinck et. al. 2007:552).
45 A separate category of psychological trauma can also result from the interaction 
between the nature of individual participation in the war and the post-war politi-
cal or social order. The outcome of the war may be the precipitating factor, 
prompting guilt and shame at having fought for or supported a defeated and de-
legitimized force, or anomie among partisans of the winning side following vic-
tory.39 At the social level, changes in roles or social status during the war may 
result in psychological distress if individuals must return to traditional roles dur-
ing peace.40 Conversely, sustained changes in social roles and hierarchies may 
cause distress for individuals who had privileged status prior to the war.41
46 DDR programs might ameliorate wartime trauma through several pathways. 
Disarmament and demobilization can help society make a cognitive break with 
the past. Symbolic actions at these stages, including destruction of arms and for-
mal demobilization ceremonies, can reinforce the beginning of a new, post-war 
order.	This	might	facilitate	ex-combatants’	attempts	to	distance	themselves	from	
wartime	 abuses	 they	 committed	or	 experienced.	Civilians	may	also	 take	 these	
actions as representative of a commitment to changed behavior on the part of 
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armed	groups,	in	turn	encouraging	greater	acceptance	of	ex-combatants	return-
ing to localities. At a more personal level, civilian victimization, whether through 
being targeted with violence or being compelled, by force or circumstance, to 
perpetrate abuse or engage in betrayals,42 can also make creating a break with the 
past salient for the entire population.
47	 The	 assistance	 most	 explicitly	 provided	 to	 deal	 with	 trauma	 comes	 through	
reintegration components of DDR programs. Reintegration can address trauma on 
the	part	of	ex-combatants,	regular	civilians,	and	whole	communities	by	bringing	
about ultimately cathartic confrontations between perpetrators and victims as 
ex-combatants	resettle.43 A first set of activities is directed specifically towards the 
ex-combatant	population.	Job	training	and	education	can	also	help	ex-combatants	
confront	the	trauma	they	experienced	and	heal	from	it	by	providing	them	with	a	
sense of confidence and direction. Psychological services (available during demo-
bilization	as	well)	might	also	include	psychiatric	evaluation	and	care	for	ex-com-
batants,	or	at	 least	basic	counseling	 to	help	ex-combatants	“learn	how	to	cope	
with everyday civilian life” (Colletta et. al. 1996b:119).44 Some of the literature 
contends that this use of therapeutic techniques is inappropriate in post-conflict 
settings because of its uniquely “Western” character (see Neuner and Elbert 2007, 
however, for a cogent critique of this contention).45 However, survey evidence dem-
onstrates	that	potential	recipients	often	express	a	desire	for	it	(see,	e.g.,	Del	Vec-
chio et. al. [2007] on civilians in Aceh). During reintegration, educational settings 
can	also	be	a	means	of	addressing	trauma,	as	in	a	program	in	Mozambique	that	
used “increased student-teacher communication, creative activities, and drama” 
to reintegrate child combatants (Kumar 1997:23). Other forms of group therapy 
can	assist	ex-combatants	in	processing	war-time	trauma.	For	example,	in	Namibia	
a veterans association worked by “assisting veterans to overcome psychological 
problems	through	the	provision	of	a	forum	for	sharing	experiences”	(Colletta	et.	al.	
1996b:189).




new life through “enhanc[ing] local understandings of challenges facing veterans 
and their families” (Ball 1997:103). Local healing and cleansing ceremonies can 
also	be	used	to	reincorporate	ex-combatants	into	the	community	(see	Stark	[2006] 
on their use in Sierra Leone). 
49	 The	ability	of	DDR	programs	or	development	projects	more	generally	to	improve	
the	psychological	health	of	beneficiaries	 is	a	complex	issue,	as	 indicated	by	the	
ways in which programs might operate to heal wartime traumas, sketched out 
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above. In Section 3, we advocate focusing analyses on discrete aspects of this 
issue. This allows for better-designed empirical analyses, and creates the possibil-
ity	of	incrementally	building	up	a	body	of	findings	on	the	subject.	
50 In doing so, it is important, however, not to lose sight of the pervasive effects of 
wartime trauma on individual behavior. The emphasis in DDR programs is usually 
on their ability to influence outcomes in distinct areas, such as creating economic 
opportunities	 for	 ex-combatants	 and	 civilians,	 stimulating	 post-war	 political	 
participation, or even working to improve the psychological well-being of vic-
tims	of	wartime	abuses	and	ex-combatants.	This	division	may	even	be	further	
reinforced by the division of labor between the various NGOs and international 
organizations involved in a DDR program, each one concentrating on its own 
projects.	While	this	is	not	problematic,	the	far-reaching	effects	of	wartime	trauma	
suggest	 the	 need	 to	 ensure	 that	 projects	 addressing	 it	 are	 not	 made	 a	 lower	 
priority.	Although	such	projects	might	not	have	as	immediate	an	impact	as	the	short-
term	economic	assistance	that	is	part	of	reinsertion	packages,	or	even	job	oppor-
tunities provided through reintegration programs, they are likely a key ingredient 
in producing sustainable progress on all the peacebuilding outcomes of interest.
2.5 Sequencing
51	 The	vast	majority	of	the	literature	on	DDR	deals	with	how	to	more	effectively	
implement programs. An ongoing, unresolved debate of particular importance 
concerns how DDR programs should be temporally sequenced. The primary 
question is whether the various components of these programs with security 
goals should be implemented prior to ones with economic development goals. Put 
differently, is disarmament a precondition for successful demobilization and 
reintegration? In what follows, we consider the effects of the sequencing of the 
components	of	DDR	programs	on	the	resumption	of	conflict.	We	also	examine	a	
logical	extension	of	this	line	of	questioning	–	the	consequences	of	where	DDR	
falls in the sequence of the entire range of peace process activities.
52 As Section 2.1 of this report indicates, current research on the relationship 
between conflict and development highlights the fundamentally interrelated nature 
of the two. Just as many studies indicate a link between poverty and violence and 
between problems of economic development and internal war,46 so too does a size-
able literature show the detrimental effects of civil war on societies and econo-
mies	(see	e.g.,	Murshed	2002; Collier et. al. 2003; Ghobarah et. al. 2003). A reac-
tion to these findings in work on DDR programs has been to attempt to deter-
mine in which arena policy makers and practitioners should concentrate their 
resources: on improving security conditions, thereby increasing chances for eco-
nomic growth, with the attendant effect of reducing the risk of conflict; or on 
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improving development conditions, thereby creating the basis for an improvement 
in	security	conditions.	Making	reference	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	
Gueli and Liebenberg (2007:86) capture this analytical dilemma: “persistent con-
ditions of insecurity prevent sustainable reconstruction and development [but] 
no amount of diplomatic mediation or military coercion will win the peace if 
people, especially the youth, have no alternative livelihood to that of the army or 
militia groups.”
53 Clearly, however, establishing security is the preeminent concern in post-conflict 
situations, even if security in and of itself is not sufficient to guarantee post-con-
flict development and the sustainable peace that could potentially result from it. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, this makes the disarmament and demobilization 
components of DDR programs the most problematic. Walter (1999) highlights 
the threat that disarmament poses to the stability of peace after civil wars. Dis-
arming	groups	become	“extremely	vulnerable”	to	attack	by	their	opponents,	and	
are no longer able to use the threat of force to guarantee that their opponents 
observe the terms of any agreements previously reached. Here, the absence of a 
guarantee of mutual good faith is at the heart of the matter:
 As groups begin to disarm, they create an increasingly tense situation. The fewer 
arms they have, the more vulnerable they feel. The more vulnerable they feel, the more 
sensitive they become to possible violations. And the more sensitive they become to 
violations, the less likely they are to fulfill their side of the bargain (Walter 1999:134).
54 The theoretical claim here is that for any agreement to persist, including peace 
agreements,	it	must	either	be	enforced	externally	or	have	self-enforcing	character-
istics. As weapons allow either side to punish the other for reneging on commit-
ments made under the agreement, they have the potential to enhance stability. A 
counter-claim emphasizes the role weapons can play in conflict escalation. The 
post-war setting for armed groups is characterized by a high level of uncertainty 
and lack of trust between them. Under these conditions, there is also a significant 
possibility that a group may not always be able to take a conciliatory stance 
towards its opponents, perhaps due to internal politics, especially pressure from 
hard-line factions. The potential for misunderstandings and increased mistrust 
this	creates	can	be	explosive	when	combined	with	easy	access	to	weapons.	Even	if	
all groups desire the success of a peace settlement, they may respond to perceived 
threats, and, given access to weapons, generate a new conflagration.
55	 Torjesen	and	MacFarlane	(2007) appear to favor the first theoretical claim. They 
contend	that	following	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan,	the	DDR	process	significantly	
contributed to post-conflict stability by not making disarmament and demobili-
zation a precondition for reintegration efforts and political reform arrangements. 
Although	a	disarmament	process	was	initiated,	only	approximately	36% of per-
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sonal weapons were turned over by combatants during registration and disarma-
ment observed by the UN.47 It appears that many combatants turned over weap-
ons to their commanders, who submitted only a fraction of these for disarma-
ment. Furthermore, demobilization was not carried out, in that most units from 
the opposition armed group were incorporated whole into the new security forces. 
Leaving war-time military structures relatively untouched contributed to “trust 
in the peace process” and “a sense of security” among the opposition command-
ers	(Torjesen	and	MacFarlane	2007:316).
56	 The	 example	of	Tajikistan	 suggests	 that	while	 creating	 security	 through	DDR	
should be of the utmost importance, the emphasis must remain on the goal of 
security itself,48 which should not be confused simplistically with the disarming 
and demobilizing of armed groups. This calls into question the conventional wis-
dom that command and control structures of formerly warring factions must be 
dismantled, lest their presence facilitate renewed conflict.49 Longo and Lust (2009) 
take on this assumption and demonstrate that by creating a balance of power, the 
presence of an armed and mobilized opposition group may force incumbents to 
comply peacefully with transitions they would otherwise seek to reverse. Essen-
tially, having a group with the military capacity to be a “spoiler” undermines the 
ability of other powerful actors to “spoil” a settlement themselves. To create the 
security that conditions future peace and development, an emphasis should be 
placed on ways to build confidence and trust between the formerly warring 
groups, to bolster the credibility of commitments made during the peace process, 
and to move forward with the implementation of new political arrangements. 
Although	the	economic	and	humanitarian	situation	of	rank-and-file	ex-combat-
ants might be a cause for long-term concern towards the beginning of a DDR 
program,	giving	commanders	a	stake	in	the	peace	process	can	ensure	the	exist-
ence of the security needed to undertake reintegration and the development activ-
ities that go along with it. 
57 This discussion also suggests that the focus in the literature on determining the 
correct	sequencing	misses	the	point	to	some	extent.	The	tendency	has	been	for	
case studies to uncover new evidence suggesting problems with whichever of the 
two perspectives is currently dominant, and then conclude that the greater atten-
tion must be paid to the other. But it may not be the case that one of the two 
approaches is best under all or even most circumstances. Beginning to lay out the 
arguments concerning sequencing in detail can help us look for ways to deter-
mine which model—security-first or development-first—is likely to produce 
better results in a given post-conflict situation. In Section 3.1.2 we propose some 
preliminary indicators of two sequencing-related outcome variables, the analysis 
of	which	could	advance	our	understanding	of	this	complex	issue.
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2.6 Adverse Effects
58 With DDR, as with any other kind of intervention, it is important to consider 
whether the programs implemented, either in the details of their implementation 
or by their very nature, result in any counterproductive dynamics. Several types 
of adverse effects are possible. First, it may be too simplistic to assume that armed 
group behavior during a war had purely negative effects. If this assumption is 
made, however, it would lead to attempts to dismantle armed groups entirely, 
even though doing so could risk eliminating any positive effects they had, wheth-
er these were in the area of security or service provision, or related to social capi-
tal and organization. Second, DDR programs can contribute to macro-level insta-
bility due to the threat disarmament and demobilization pose to armed groups 
that	are	wary	of	the	behavior	of	opponents,	and	to	the	security	of	individual	ex-
combatants	faced	with	surrendering	their	weapons	and	abandoning	their	exist-
ing, military social networks. Third, tensions between civilians and 
ex-combatants	 can	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 DDR	 programs	 either	 through	 relative	
insecurity	on	the	part	of	civilians	or	resentment	towards	ex-combatants	based	on	
targeted benefits. Fourth, and perhaps of most concern, DDR programs can gen-




gram in Haiti in the mid-1990s. By buying-up even damaged and unusable weap-
ons, the program appears to have enriched some armed actors and organized 
criminals, who were able to take advantage of it by using the funds secured in this 
way to upgrade their arsenals.
59 In post-conflict settings there is a tendency by international organizations 
involved in the DDR process to assume that all things associated with armed 
groups are negative. This is certainly reinforced by accounts of the violence and 
destruction	of	war,	human	rights	violations	during	conflict	including	sexual	vio-
lence, recruitment of child soldiers, and even the material prosperity of combat-
ants	achieved	through	extortion,	pillaging,	and	the	receipt	of	external	assistance.	
However, not only is negative caricaturing of armed groups potentially unfair, 
but it risks overlooking the positive impacts they may have had on communities 
and individuals. DDR programs can benefit by incorporating a full understand-
ing of how armed groups interacted with civilians during the war, allowing them 
to see to it that development and security gains fostered by the armed groups 
themselves	 do	 not	 evaporate	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 DDR.	One	 telling	 example	
comes from Uganda. Following DDR, law and order at the local level suffered in 
some areas, as the presence of combatants had contributed to some form of order 
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(Colletta et. al. 1996b:192). The veterans associations lauded by much of the liter-
ature	on	DDR	as	aiding	in	social	and	economic	reintegration	are	another	example	
of the importance of taking positive aspects of armed groups into account. 
The ties that develop between comrades-in-arms during war prove useful in indi-
viduals’	attempts	to	adjust	to	the	post-conflict	environment.	Combatants	(from	
the same group) may trust each other while at the same time being very distrust-
ful of civilians or even DDR program staff. The hierarchical ties between com-
manders and fighters may also be of use in securing discipline from reintegrating 
ex-combatants.	Yet,	if	all	ties	between	members	of	an	armed	group	are	severed	in	
accordance with the logic of demobilization, DDR programs might lose the ability 
to use the social capital embedded in these ties to their benefit.
60 Section 2.5,	above,	explored	in	detail	some	of	the	dangers	to	stability	inherent	in	
disarmament and demobilization. These components of DDR can be especially 
destabilizing if carried out incompletely (see, e.g., Berdal [1996:28] on partial dis-
armament). This is the second type of adverse effect that DDR programs may 
cause: armed group insecurity leading to a generally unstable situation. This sug-
gests that not only should the sequencing of components of DDR programs be 
approached cautiously, but greater attention should be paid to generating trust 
between	opposing	groups	within	ex-combatant	populations,	especially	between	
commanders, and trust in the DDR process itself. The typical solution to the 
security risks to armed groups created by disarmament and demobilization activ-
ities is the presence of a third party guarantor overseeing the process. Third par-
ties or the creation of security forces integrating opposing armed groups are also 
thought	to	mitigate	the	individual-level	insecurity	faced	by	ex-combatants	going	
through the disarmament process. In practice, UN peace operations have played 
the third-party role in many peace processes. However, rather than assuming 
that participants in DDR find the UN (or any other third party) inherently cred-
ible,	 ascertaining	 contemporaneous	 perceptions	 of	 external	 guarantors	 could	
allow DDR programs to identify and solve potential problems.
61 A recurring theme in literature evaluating DDR programs carried out in the early 
1990s	is	the	potential	for	tension	between	civilians	and	ex-combatants.	Resettle-
ment	of	ex-combatants	might	precipitate	fears	of	abuse	on	the	part	of	local	civilians.	
Micro-disarmament	 programs	 including	 civilians	 could	 exacerbate	 these	 fears,	
especially if communities were induced to surrender weapons as a condition for 
receiving development aid (see Kopel et. al. [2004]	 for	 examples).	 This	 might	
strengthen	 resistance	 to	 resettlement	 and	 reintegration	 of	 ex-combatants	 and	
concern	over	the	legitimacy	of	the	peace	process.	At	one	extreme,	new	hostilities	
based	on	 a	 civilian-ex-combatant	 cleavage	 could	 ensue,	or	 at	 another	 extreme,	
armed groups and criminals might have free reign if the basis for civilian resist-




ants occupy a privileged position because of material benefits provided to them 
by the programs.50 Similar to the consequences of civilian insecurity, resentment 
could	undermine	attempts	to	reintegrate	ex-combatants	into	localities.	Compo-
nents	 of	DDR	 designed	 to	 turn	 armed	 group	 leaders	 and	 ex-combatants	 into	
stake-holders in continued peace might also undermine social and individual psy-
chological healing from war trauma if they contribute to a perception of impunity 
of perpetrators of war-time abuses or of rewards for bad behavior. Indeed, such 
perceptions could very well undermine the legitimacy of the peace process and the 
post-war government as a whole.
62 Perhaps most troubling of all, DDR programs could unwittingly create incen-
tives for groups and individuals to engage in violence or other actions undermining 
the peace, or in behaviors detrimental to development. In this regard, practitioners 
constructing DDR programs and scholars analyzing them could profit from 
greater attention to a large literature in development economics on the effectiveness 
of	external	assistance	(for	an	overview,	see	Easterly	[2006] and Collier [2007]). 
For	example,	although	incorrect,	the	perception	of	benefits	accruing	through	the	
DDR process in Sierra Leone to the RUF, a particularly violent and abusive armed 
group,	 prompted	 other	 ex-combatants	 to	 carry	 out	 violence	 against	 civilians	 in	
Liberia. Their assumption was that the group that was most feared would be the 
most appeased by the international community when it intervened to support the 
peace process, so that aid would be redirected towards them (Hoffman 2004). 
63 Armed group recalcitrance in participating in DDR might similarly be encour-
aged by the possibility that the desire to move forward with the peace process could 
lead to additional benefits for or concessions to the group and its members. This 
type	of	moral	hazard	problem	is	 likely	more	severe	 in	the	case	of	externally-
supported DDR programs. In a less deliberate way, DDR programs could distort 
the economic choices of local actors in ways detrimental to long-term develop-
ment.	For	example,	if	a	reintegration	program	focuses	on	creating	small	business-
es and fostering entreprenuership, actors might engage in these activities despite 
their being unsuited to the local opportunity structure (absent DDR), solely in 
order to obtain benefits from the DDR program. This would result in the alloca-
tion of human capital and time to inefficient economic endeavors. 
64 Laying out the potential unintended consequences of DDR programs is a necessary 
step in resolving the first-order questions about their impact. Assuming that the 
positive claims about the DDR programs relationship to peacebuilding are borne 
out, the trade-off between these and potential negative effects of the programs 
would still need to be assessed carefully. 




65 The design of DDR programs varies widely, as do the mechanisms through 
which they might help in the transition from war to sustainable peace. The range 
of these mechanisms suggests that evaluating the ability of DDR programs to 
contribute	to	peace	is	complex.	In	this	section,	we	touch	on	three	principal	diffi-
culties involved in studying DDR programs: conceptualization and measurement 
of the appropriate outcome variables; accounting for DDR program heterogeneity; 
and	achieving	 identification	and	external	validity	 in	 empirical	 analyses.	 In	our	
discussion of the last difficulty, we propose ways of overcoming these challenges 
in order to conduct sound evaluations of the effects of DDR programs.
3.1 Conceptualizing and Measuring Peacebuilding Outcomes
66 Although many studies claim to isolate outcome variables thought relevant to 
DDR success, few actually specify concrete measures of the goals of DDR and 
how these supposedly relevant factors map onto and contribute towards them. A 
first step is to disaggregate “success” into topical areas within which well-defined 










 In what follows, we concentrate on how to conceptualize the main questions of 
interest within each area: we identify a set of outcome variables, and corresponding 
empirical indicators of them, which can then be studied to evaluate the mecha-
nisms through which DDR is thought to operate. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize 
these. 
3.1.1 Substantive Outcomes
67 The main substantive claims concerning the impact of DDR programs are that 
they reduce the risk that a civil war will recur; stimulate economic development; 
prevent post-war escalation in violence and crime and possibly reduce each of 
these; bolster political participation and civic engagement; and ameliorate the 
impact of wartime trauma on post-war society and individuals.
68 The emphasis on the potential of DDR to reduce the risk of civil war starting 
anew is, at its heart, a concern about the onset of violent conflict, and, in particu-
lar, the relationship between past wars and the risk of future ones. Peacebuilding 
success in this sense, then, can be understood as the absence of hostilities between 
formerly warring groups. But several other issues are intimately connected to the 
concern that former combatants could instigate new rounds of violence. Could 
the	presence	of	ex-combatants	or	of	left-over	weapons	increase	the	risk	of	a	new	
civil	war,	even	if	the	actors	are	different?	Could	ex-combatants	leave	the	country	
and cause or participate in conflicts in neighboring countries?51 Conceptually, 
then, several aspects of war recurrence as a outcome variable can be coded for 
analysis: recurrence of the same conflict, onset of a new war in the same country, 
participation	of	ex-combatants	in	conflicts	outside	the	country,	and,	perhaps,	the	
country’s involvement in an international war. 
69	 To	examine	the	effect	of	DDR	on	war	recurrence	outcomes	directly	would	require	
a cross-national framework, allowing comparison across all civil war-affected 
countries, with and without DDR programs, for a certain time period. There are 
serious drawbacks to such an analysis, particularly as problems of mutual causa-
tion and omitted variables are difficult to overcome. For a treatment of these 
problems and recommendations for solving them as best as possible given the 
limitations of the data, see Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Given the problems 
involved in a cross-national analysis, we suggest analyzing the channels through 
which DDR is posited to act on reducing the risk of war recurrence.
70	 Many	scholars	believe	that	DDR	raises	individuals’	opportunity	costs	to	partici-
pating in conflict, thereby lowering the risk of war recurrence. This implies that 
DDR programs should lower unemployment or underemployment and raise 
either average levels of household income or increase the income of individuals 
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from	 at-risk	 groups	 (for	 example,	 young	men).	The	 association	between	DDR	
and a variety of other measures of economic activity would also be consistent 
with the claim that DDR affects individuals’ decision calculus through the oppor-
tunity	 costs	 mechanism.	 A	 straightforward	 example	 would	 be	 local	 rates	 of	 
economic growth. Others include local levels of infrastructure (roads, access to 
potable	water,	 electricity),	 educational	 enrollment,	 and	 proxies	 for	 the	 ease	 of	
doing business (e.g., average number of days, procedures required for licensing).
71 Employment statistics are one of the most commonly used outcome variables to 
judge	 the	 effectiveness	 of	DDR	programs.	Employment	 and	 income	 statistics	
can be used with a survey instrument to determine success of program partici-
pants	in	the	job	market	compared	to	a	control	group	that	did	not	participate	in	
the	program,	with	the	latter	made	up	of	other	ex-combatants	or	non-combatants	
who are demographically similar to program participants. However, the com-
parison	to	a	control	group	is	often	not	made	in	policy	reports.	For	example,	a	
World Bank-funded study indicates that about half of program participants in the 
Sierra Leone DDR program report employment within a month or so after dis-
charge. The study, however, does not give comparable statistics for non-participant 
ex-combatants	 (World	 Bank	 2003:11, 63).52 An assessment of the Emergency 
Demobilization and Reintegration Program in Eritrea created following the end 
of the interstate war with Ethiopia in 2000 provided information about the employ-
ment prospects of demobilized soldiers as compared to other members of their 
communities (World Bank 2009a:35–36). But, as with the Sierra Leone study, it 
did not report information on the employment outcomes of former soldiers who did 
not go through the program. Knowing employment prospects in the community 
certainly allows for some perspective on the potential effectiveness of the DDR 
program—in this case the average employment rate of demobilized soldiers was 
10% higher than others in the same community. However, the comparison to other 
former soldiers who did not participate is crucial to understanding whether it is 
the DDR program that is behind the outcome. If there is no difference in the 
employment	outcomes	of	ex-combatants	who	participated	in	DDR	and	those	who	
did	not,	then	ex-combatants’	better	employment	prospects	as	compared	to	civil-
ians might simply be an artifact of some characteristic of former soldiers which 
means that they are more likely to be employed than civilians.53 
72 Ideally,	 ex-combatants	would	 be	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 participate	 in	DDR,	 or	
programs would be randomly assigned over localities. This can be achieved with-
out limiting program participation by randomizing the order in which individuals 
enter a program or in which programs are rolled out across localities. Since the lit-
erature is silent as to whether the opportunity cost mechanism applies primarily 
to	ex-combatants	or	ex-combatants	and	civilians,	a	supplementary	survey	could	
sample the entire population within treatment and control areas.
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73 Another contention of research on DDR programs and war recurrence is that 
disarmament and demobilization make a return to war more difficult for armed 
groups by dismantling their command structure and links between commanders 
and fighters, and by taking weapons off the battlefield and out of the hands of 
former combatants. The mechanisms linking DDR to the ease of remobilization 
are not specified in the literature.  Rather, two general claims are made. First, dis-
armament reduces the number of weapons in circulation, making it more difficult 
for groups to turn to violence. Second, the defining characteristic of demobilization 
is the “civilianization” of former combatants (Berdal 1996), their transformation 
back into non-combatants (Clark 1996; UN DPKO 1999:73). This further entails 
that “structures of armed forces and groups are broken down” (UN IDDRS [2006] 
§2.10, para. 4; Knight and Özerdem [2004] also reference this goal), which should 
“reduce the likelihood of remobilization” (UN IDDRS [2006] §4.20, para. 8.7). 
74 Several indicators can capture aspects of the ease of remobilization argument. 
Measures	of	the	availability	of	weapons	and	ammunition	at	a	general	level	in	the	
country (prices, estimates of stock), as well as individual reporting in surveys of 
ownership or access to the same, especially by former commanders, can provide 
a more detailed picture of any effects of disarmament. 
75	 The	social	networks	of	ex-combatants	are	clearly	another	indicator	of	the	ease	of	
remobilization, but better conceptualization of how these networks are linked to 
remobilization is imperative. Nilsson (2008) makes a key contribution by sepa-
rating essentially omnipresent background factors like dissatisfaction and mar-
ginalization	of	ex-combatants	 from	the	presence	of	actors	who	can	coordinate	
and employ combatants. Rather than their presence being a sufficient condition 
for renewed conflict, these “remobilizers” (pp. 30–33) are more likely to succeed 
in their efforts if they already have some social relationship to former combatants, 
allowing	 them	 to	 take	 advantage	of	 that	position	 in	 existing	 social	 networks.54 
This implies that a fruitful way to analyze the ease of remobilization argument 
would	be	 to	assess	whether	DDR	affects	ex-combatants’	 ties	 to	one	another—
their	frequency	of	interaction	and	proximity	of	dwellings,	their	willingness	to	act	
on behalf of one another, and their perceptions of personal obligation to each 
other	and	to	their	faction.	These	indicators	could	be	measured	for	ex-combatants	
in general, and could be applied to relationships between former fighters and mid-
level commanders, and between mid-level commanders and political and business 
elites. Empirically separating the horizontal former fighter to former fighter ties 
from the vertical command-fighter or elite-command ties would be especially 
useful considering the dearth of evidence on the relative importance of specific 
mechanisms for remobilization and on the ability of DDR programs to affect 
these ties.55 
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76 The second area of research we outlined in Section 2 concerned the danger of a 
post-war resurgence in violence and criminal activity. To reduce the risk of this, 
the international community has focused on disarmament and micro-disarma-
ment initiatives in DDR programs, in addition to the employment and income 
outcomes mentioned above. While statistics on the numbers and types of weapons 
collected by the programs are inherently appealing, better indicators of DDR 
success would center on the outcomes of interest themselves. These could include 
statistics on crime and violence committed by participants and non-participants.56 
Note	that	these	may	need	to	cover	civilians	and	ex-combatants	alike,	depending	
on the scope of the DDR programs involved. Local crime rates or statistics of 
victimization from violence, as well as changes in the size of the incarcerated 
population, are additional ways to get at this question. Since much of the micro-
disarmament literature posits a link between weapons circulation and violence 
and crime, interviews with incarcerated criminals and a sample of law-abiding 
citizens could help determine the degree to which the availability of weapons 
influences illegal activity.
77 Weapons prices could also be used as an indicator of crime and violence, of the 
presence of insecurity for the population. Here, comparison of the prices of small 
arms or small arms ammunition would need to be made across similar areas, 
some currently involved in DDR programs and others not. However, care would 
need to be taken to ensure that disarmament components of DDR were not ongoing 
in these areas, since the idea would be to understand the effect of DDR programs 
on	only	the	demand	for	weapons	–	a	proxy	for	insecurity	–	and	not on supply. 
78 One of the main questions research on the effects of DDR on civic and political 
participation	would	need	to	examine	is	whether	political	incorporation	of	armed	
groups	and	individual	ex-combatants	reduces	the	likelihood	that	they	will	resort	
to arms in the future. In the case of individuals this is particularly important given 
seemingly contradictory findings about the effects of war on political participa-
tion. Blattman (2009)	and	Bellows	and	Miguel	(2009)	find	that	exposure	to	vio-
lence	increases	political	engagement,	in	the	case	of	ex-combatants	in	the	former	
and civilians in the latter. Shewfelt (2009), however, while finding a similar effect, 
also	exposes	an	attendant	polarization	in	attitudes.57 
79 One of the mechanisms posited to be at work is that individuals’ willingness to 
work within the political system reduces the risk of conflict. An indicator of this 
willingness could be participation in voting, with the turnout rate of DDR par-
ticipants	 compared	 to	 that	of	non-participants.	Also	exploiting	 information	on	
elections, an effect of DDR on individual political participation could be verified 
or disconfirmed depending on whether variation in voter turnout is correlated 
with	 the	 length	of	exposure	of	a	 locality	 to	DDR	programs	 (assuming	 that	 the	
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could also be used as an indicator of socio-political engagement. As for a longer-
term evaluation, given a sufficiently long time period over which DDR is put into 
place, variation in the physical presence (offices, personnel) or electoral strength 
of a political party associated with a former armed group could indicate a rela-
tionship between DDR and group incorporation into the political system. 
Depending	on	the	local	context,	measures	of	the	electoral	advantage	of	incum-
bent candidates could also indicate the degree to which former armed groups 
have access to working within the system.
80 A potentially more difficult relationship to ascertain would be that between DDR 
programs and perceptions of the legitimacy of the post-war government and the 
peace process. Legitimacy is an often-used term that few can actually define 
clearly or measure accurately, yet the claim is often made that the sustainability of 
peace relies on the legitimacy of the post-war bargain (Parsons 1963; Brinkerhoff 
2005:5; Barnett and Zürcher 2007:8).58 We suggest two types of indicators that 
could be used to assess potential effects of DDR on legitimacy: individual per-
ceptions of government legitimacy, and individual cooperation with authorities 
(based on self-reporting or institutional reporting of the degree of public cooper-
ation) As any effect of DDR on legitimacy would likely be due to the program’s 
macro-level characteristics,  it would be difficult to isolate the mechanism through 
which	DDR	operated,	even	if	a	correlation	existed	with	these	indicators.	In	this	
case, randomization of which localities are selected to receive the programs (if 
there are not sufficient resources to do the programs across the board), or of the 
order in which localities are visited by DDR and government officials would 
allow evaluation of this potential effect.  Surveys could then allow a comparison 
of participant attitudes towards the peace process and perceptions of government 
legitimacy to those of non-participants. 
81 Finally, all of the mechanisms through which DDR is thought to mitigate the del-
eterious effects of wartime trauma appear to be amenable to evaluation through 
randomized evaluation (RE) designs. These include participation in DDR helping 
to produce a cognitive break with the past, the reconciliatory effects of perpetrator-
victim interaction during resettlement, the possibility of employment obtained 
through DDR programs bolstering individuals’ sense of purpose, the effects of 
individual counseling and individual and group therapy, and the potential for 
“community sensitization” programs to foster good will towards reintegrating 
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ex-combatants.	Outcome	variables	that	could	be	compared	across	DDR	partici-
pants and non-participants include measures of psychological well-being (see, 
e.g., Ryff and Keyes 1995), hopefulness (e.g., Snyder et. al. 1991), depression (e.g., 
Beck et. al 1988), and PTSD (e.g., Blake et. al. 1995). Indicators of social reintegra-
tion	such	as	post-conflict	marriage	rates	for	ex-combatants	and	rates	of	divorce	for	
pre-	or	during-conflict	ex-combatant	marriages	could	also	reveal	the	degree	to	
which former combatants are able to function in a peacetime society, and percep-
tions of acceptance by the community.
3.1.2 Implementing DDR: Evaluating Claims about Sequencing
82 In this report we have focused on the effects of DDR programs. Although by-
and-large we have eschewed detailed discussion of the impact of program design 
on DDR effectiveness, we did single out one area of concern within it, namely the 
sequencing of DDR (see Section 2.5). Given scarce resources, how can policy-
makers evaluate contending claims about the order in which DDR interventions 
should be carried out? One sticking point for evaluation of sequencing is that due 
to the potential macro-level effects of parts of DDR, it is unlikely that sequencing 
could be randomized within a single DDR program.
83	 Setting	aside	experimental	 research	designs,	 a	possibility	 is	 to	combine	a	 large	
comparative cross-national analysis of the sequencing of DDR with a detailed 
examination,	through	interviews	or	elite	surveys,	of	the	attitudes	of	commanders	
and leading politicians towards the DDR process. As even the most rigorously 
conducted	statistical	study	would	be	subject	to	methodological	criticisms,	evalu-
ating specific mechanisms referenced by arguments about sequencing would give 
it	credibility.	For	example,	a	contention	of	proponents	of	security-first	logics	is	
that disarmament and demobilization are critical opportunities for the warring 
parties to build confidence in each other, allowing the peace process to consoli-
date and move forward. Conversely, arguments for carrying out reintegration 
programs alongside or prior to disarmament and demobilization focus on the 
need to create concrete stakes in peace particularly for armed group elites but also 
the rank-and-file. The claim is that disarmament and demobilization can create 
conditions of strategic insecurity at the level of the group and economic insecuri-
ty for individuals precipitating renewed conflict unless reintegration has created 
selective	incentives	for	armed	groups	and	ex-combatants	to	adhere	to	the	peace.	
84 Empirical	 analyses	 could	 therefore	 examine	 two	conceptual	outcome	variables	
linked to the sequencing debate: confidence-building and stakes in peace. A pos-
sible indicator of confidence-building could be the level of trust that principal 
commanders and politicians linked to the armed groups going through DDR 
have	in	their	opponents.	The	stakes	argument	would	examine	the	level	of	trust	in	
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relation to politicians’ and commanders’ commitment to the peace process. The 
more that commitment is divorced from the level of trust in opponents, the more 
likely it is that stakes in peace and not confidence-building mechanisms are at 
work. In an empirical analysis, it might be plausible to measure these indicators 
over	time,	and	to	examine	whether	trust	(or	commitment	to	peace	without	trust)	
tracks specific elements of the DDR process.
3.1.3 Ascertaining the Unintended Consequences of DDR
85 The unforeseen adverse effects of DDR programs become apparent in many stud-
ies through anecdotes based on detailed, local histories of DDR. However, going 
beyond this, the categorization of types of adverse effects allows a body of evidence 
to develop across programs, localities, countries, and regions, and even the use of 
findings from related studies in other fields of research. 
86 We singled out four broad ways in which DDR could have a problematic impact 
in a post-war setting. First, if DDR fails to take into account the positive effects 
armed groups may have had on individuals and localities during conflict, it risks 
erasing corresponding welfare gains from these. Post-conflict, pre-DDR surveys 
across localities could establish civilian perceptions of armed groups and indicate 
any potential benefits stemming from the presence of a group. Second, disarma-
ment and demobilization actions by their nature risk creating conditions of inse-
curity for armed groups and their members, as discussed in Section 2.5 on 
sequencing. Randomization of DDR programs can be a key asset in evaluating 
whether	such	an	effect	exists	at	the	individual	level.	If	the	order	in	which	ex-com-
batants enter a DDR program is chosen at random, and particularly if participants 
are	not	separated	according	to	faction,	responses	of	ex-combatants	in	the	middle	
of the disarmament/demobilization phase or following it could be compared to 
those	of	ex-combatants	who	had	not	yet	exited	their	armed	group	or	surrendered	
their	weapons.	Third,	tensions	between	ex-combatants	and	civilians	may	emerge.	
Staggering of the implementation of resettlement and reintegration components 




standing in the community. Indicators could also be based on interpersonal 
exchanges	between	former	combatants	and	civilians.	For	example,	a	measure	of	
incidence	of	discrimination	against	ex-combatants	could	be	examined.	So,	too,	
could information about intra-communal disputes, and threats and confronta-
tions between former combatants and civilians. 
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Violence and Crime  
Prevention













Legitimacy of  
government





Presence of civil war between same actors
Ex-combatant participation in regional civil wars 
Unemployment rate
Economic growth rate
Ease of doing business (e.g., average number  
of days, procedures required for licensing)




Police statistics on crime
Size of incarcerated population
Prevalence of violent behavior
Price of small arms
Number of candidates contesting elections
Degree of incumbent advantage
Knowledge of political system rules
Political party presence (offices, etc.)
Voter turnout
Political party membership
Participation in voluntary civic associations  
(non-leisure)
Political contributions (monetary)
Knowledge of political system rules
Public opinion
Voluntary assistance to/cooperation with  
government agencies
Ex-combatant opinion / Public opinion
Perpetrator-victim interaction
Civilian acceptance of ex-combattants
Opposing armed group interaction
Ex-combatant acceptance of former enemies 
Clinical/survey measures of psychological well-
being, hopefulness, depression, and PTSD
Ex-combatant post-conflict marriage rates, divorce 
rates for pre-/during-conflict marriages
Ex-combatant-civilian social ties













[Positive local role of 
armed groups; Perverse 
incentives]
Indicator 
Politician and commander trust in opposing armed 
group(s)
Degree of independence of politician and  
commander commitment to peace from trust in 
opponents
Ex-combatant opinion
Exchange of threats and violence between civilians 
and ex-combatants 
Disputes between civilians and ex-combatants
Incidence of discrimination against ex-combatants
Ex-combatant perceptions of stigmatization 
[Context specific]
Table 3.2 Suggested Outcome Variables and Indicators, DDR Implementation
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3.2 Measuring DDR
87 When a DDR program carries out a pre-defined task (reintegration, etc.), the 
temptation for scholars is to compare that instance of “reintegration” to another and 
ask if “reintegration” works. We contend, however, that there is in fact a great deal 
of hetero geneity across what are conventionally understood DDR programs.59 
Two additional sources of error with respect to evaluations of DDR programs 
exist:	differences	between	planned	activities	and	services	actually	delivered	under	a	
single DDR program, in addition to differences in the timing of service delivery 
across space; and difficulties in coding when DDR programs end. In this section 
we discuss the nature of these challenges.
88 Programs differ from one another along a large number of dimensions, including:
•	 which	 agencies/organizations	 are	 involved	 in	 the	program	generally,	 and	of	
these, which carry out specific elements of it; 
•	 whether	 all	phases	of	DDR	are	 intended	 to	be	 conducted,	 and	 the	order	 in	
which they occur or overlap;
•	 the	specific	activities	carried	out	within	each	phase	of	DDR,	and	the	order	of	





beneficiaries are targeted for participation).
89 The wide disparities between programs carried out in some of the post-conflict 
contexts	in	Table	A.1	can	seem	as	large	as	the	difference	between	having	and	not	
having a DDR program. The cost of the program from 1991–1995 in Ethiopia fol-
lowing the overthrow of the Derge regime was roughly 70 times larger than the 
cost	of	 the	program	 for	 ex-combatants	 in	East	Timor	 following	 the	 end	of	 its	
24-year war for independence from Indonesia. Yet the difference in the per-person 
cost of the two ran in the opposite direction: program spending standardized by 
the	number	of	ex-combatants	in	the	program	was	roughly	three	times larger in 
East Timor than in Ethiopia.60 Some programs are similar because of their scope 
–	 for	 example	 the	month-long	 demilitarization	 project	 carried	 out	 in	 1996 by 
UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) to cut the number of weapons in circula-
tion (Boothby 1998) and the 2001–2005 disarmament program in Papua New 
Guinea (Spark and Bailey 2005). But programs with such a narrow focus are far 
removed from the current mainstream of DDR programs, which attempt holistic 
implementation	of	projects	covering	all	aspects	of	DDR.
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90 In addition to cross-program differences, there is the issue of within-program 
heterogeneity. Any activities performed under a given program have the potential 
to differ from what was intended during planning stages, and to differ 
systematically by region or over time based on differences in organizations 
responsible for implementation, or based on staffing within a single organization. 
During the disarmament and demobilization process in Liberia between 1996 
and 1997,	 for	 example,	 peacekeeping	 contingents	 supervising	 the	disarmament	
and	demobilization	process	registered	ex-combatants	and	issued	them	demobiliz	a-
tion ID cards. Although certain standards were set for what weapons and quantity 
of	ammunition	were	necessary	to	certify	an	individual’s	status	as	an	ex-combat-
ant, wide variation in the quality of weapon accepted occurred across sites. Even 
for the same site, standards became stricter over time (CAII 1997:16). To illus-
trate the potential for a very large degree of variation in what participation in a 
DDR	program	might	mean	for	any	individual	ex-combatant	or	civilian,	during	
the	MDRP	program	in	Angola,	no	fewer	than	57 NGOs, from various countries, 
were involved in carrying out 177 separate	 sub-projects	 for	 the	 reintegration	
phase of DDR (see World Bank 2009b:28–32).
91 Finally, given the comprehensive nature of many DDR programs, which might 
include straight disarmament and demobilization security elements combined 
with vocational training, small-business loans, and community reconciliation 
measures,	 it	becomes	hard	 to	define	 exactly	when	a	DDR	program	concludes.	
Trivially, of course, all programs do have a clear end point. But if a DDR program 
ends and is followed by development assistance programs that effectively fund 
the same types of activities as the reintegration component of the DDR program, 
how	 should	 this	 be	 interpreted?	One	 example	 is	 a	 series	 of	 reintegration	 pro-
grams for former soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which started in 1996 with 
the international peacekeeping force and has continued up until the present. 
Being	too	lenient	and	always	concluding	that	follow-up	projects	are	all	somehow	
part of a larger DDR plan would confuse the issue. But if these programs are 
actually funding the same activities, what is meaningful about distinguishing 
between them.
92 Since we are interested in analyzing DDR as a treatment and observing its effects 
on peacebuilding outcomes, the three issues of measurement raised above pose 
serious problems for determining program effects in a comparative framework. 
In	particular,	each	one	is	a	form	of	measurement	error	in	the	explanatory	varia-
bles capturing DDR programs.  We would like to estimate coefficients linking 
these measures of DDR to peacebuilding outcomes.  But as is well known, meas-
urement error (in this case error that is unlikely to be random) would bias param-
eter estimates, confounding the analysis of program effects.
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3.3 Identification and External Validity
93 Our basic recommendation concerning the evaluation of DDR is that, as much as 
possible, randomization should be incorporated into future programs. But note 
that since randomization in-and-of-itself does not resolve all the problems that 
we have raised, including the measurement problem, program heterogeneity, etc., 
the lessons learned from randomized impact evaluations of specific programs 
should not be overstated. 
94 The benefit of using randomized evaluations (RE) is that through randomly 
assigning	subjects	 (whether	 individuals,	 localities,	etc.)	 to	the	treatment	policy,	
the researcher can eliminate potential problems of mutual causation. Since DDR 
programs	occur	in	settings	in	which	many	other	development	projects	are	being	
carried out, observational studies would need to control for a long list of other 
potentially influential, rival programs. RE design eliminates this problem, allow-
ing better causal inferences to be made.
95 Our discussion underscores difficulties that are not limited to observational stud-
ies. Program heterogeneity brings up a classic problem with RE. Although we 
can have confidence that our results are correct for the sample in which the RE 
was	carried	out,	and	in	the	context	that	it	occurred,	we	have	little	guidance	about	
whether those findings carry over directly to other samples, and other settings. 
Rodrik	(2009)	provides	a	detailed	explanation	of	the	problems	inherent	in	gener-
alizing from RE findings. Unfortunately, in the case of DDR programs, we also 
have	much	information	suggesting	that	context	will	matter	greatly	for	the	specif-
ics of programs and how they play out on the ground. 
96 The previous sections of this report aim to push scholars and policy makers stud-
ying	DDR	to	be	explicit	about	the	mechanisms	leading	from	DDR	to	peacebuild-
ing	outcomes	of	interest,	and	at	a	more	basic	level	to	be	explicit	about	what	are	
those goals. This emphasis on mechanisms can help improve any evaluations, 
whether it uses RE or observational methods. For both types of research, mecha-
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97 Reading the liter ature on DDR programs can be disconcerting in the 
repetitiveness of the “lessons learned” and the frequency with which these same 
conclusions are touted as advancing our understanding. When we try to distill what 
we know about the effects of DDR programs on concrete outcomes of interest, it 
becomes apparent that our knowledge about the impact of these programs is limited. 
Partially this is due to the inherently difficult questions that evaluation of DDR 
programs must address. We would be remiss not to acknowledge this as well as the 
sincere efforts of scholars and practitioners to do their best to answer these questions.
98 It	is	clear,	however,	that	two	issues	in	the	vast	majority	of	studies	prevent	us	from	
incrementally building up a body of evidence about whether DDR programs con-
tribute to peacebuilding. First, many studies start from the assumption that DDR 
helps build post-conflict peace. The result is that “success” in terms of the sub-
stantive goals of the programs is often not defined. Instead, the main concern of 
evaluations is identifying and solving obstacles to the implementation of pro-
grams. Yet without a clear and specific articulation of the desired impacts of DDR, 
it	becomes	difficult	to	assess	whether	and	to	what	extent	DDR	has	made	a	differ-
ence on the ground. Second, the omission of a strategy for impact evaluation in 
program design is pervasive across many types of public and development assist-
ance	programs,	with	DDR	no	exception.	Evaluations	are	usually	post-hoc	and	
are not based on a systematic approach that can compare the effectiveness of the 
same	 set	 of	 policies	 across	 different	 contexts.	 This	 limits	 cumulative	 learning	
about program effects. 
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99 Moving	forward,	research	will	be	able	to	advance	our	understanding	of	DDR	by	
honing in on specific research questions rather than trying to evaluate DDR’s 
overall	“success.”	This	report	extracted	a	total	of	17 conceptual outcomes of inter-
est from the literature and proposed more than twice as many potential indica-
tors of these outcomes (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The indicators run the gamut from 
straight forward measures of a return to violence and the health of the economy 
to assessments of the operation of political system, and to societal and individual 
recovery.	This	range	highlights	the	complexity	of	programs	encompassed	by	the	
concept of DDR. Future analyses will therefore be better able to ascertain the 
effectiveness	of	DDR	as	a	peacebuilding	tool	by	disaggregating	the	complex	pack-
age of programs comprising it. 
100 Separating out the different facets of DDR programs will guide researchers more 
naturally to the appropriate empirical strategies. The question at hand can struc-
ture the research design employed, rather than that design being constrained by 
the need to deal with an aggregate concept like DDR. This type of problem-driven 
approach will likely have greater traction in evaluating the impact of DDR. For 
example,	post-conflict	crime	might	be	a	challenge	to	peacebuilding	success.	But	a	
research	project	that	starts	by	analyzing	crime	in	and	of	itself	may	very	well	be	
more productive than one that starts out by viewing crime through the lens of 
peacebuilding, a lens that could remove potentially significant factors from the 
scope of the analysis.
101 An additional implication of this report is that a comparative approach should 
be central to future research on DDR. We can learn a great deal from studies of 
individual programs or countries.  But serious comparison across countries of 
relevant aspects of conflicts and the programs designed to address them will pro-
vide	invaluable	insight	into	the	complex	interaction	between	DDR	programs	and	
social processes beyond the insights a single case can provide. A comparative 
approach	can	be	explicit,	through	statistical	analysis	or	case	comparisons.	It	can	
also be used implicitly to enrich individual case studies. Findings from studies of 
a single program or country which focus on isolating the pathways through which 
programs might operate and which keep broader research questions in mind can 
be	readily	applied	to	other	contexts,	since	this	approach	helps	identify	the	extent	
to which such comparisons are valid. As single case studies will inevitably be 
used to draw conclusions regardless of the caveats that researchers attach to them, 
consciously building in the potential for comparison will also avoid misinterpre-
tations	of	the	evidence	or	misapplications	of	a	program	to	a	context	that	is	not	in	
fact analogous to the one for which it was originally developed.
102 The recommendations on methodology in Section 3 point to the powerful ana-
lytical tools currently available to researchers to evaluate not only DDR but the 
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conclusion: building ev idence about the effects of ddr 
larger set of peacebuilding interventions of which it is a part. Indeed, researchers 
often	turn	to	such	tools	as	methodological	fixes	to	get	 the	bottom	line	answer	
concerning a program. Yet this report indicates that answering “how does it work?” 
often provides greater leverage over a question and better recommendations for 
policy makers than getting the bottom line answer to “does it work?” Observa-
tional studies might appear to have a good grasp of programs in comparative 
perspective, but methodological shortcomings particularly with respect to disen-
tangling mutual causation bring their findings into question. Even if a Rand-
omized Evaluation were conducted to deal with mutual causation and tease out 
answers, the predicted effects of an identical program carried out in a different 
setting would be unclear. By being specific about what is the relevant set of coun-
terfactual comparisons and by identifying the mechanisms at work, researchers 
can generate findings that can better assist policy makers in addressing the com-
plex	issues	at	play	whenever	peacebuilding	efforts	are	contemplated.
103 In this review we have tried to refocus future analysis of DDR programs on spe-
cific research questions. Do DDR programs have an impact on four core areas of 
substantive goals: preventing war recurrence and strengthening linkages between 
development and peace; reducing levels of post-war crime and violence; increas-
ing civic and political participation; and treating the scars left on individuals and 
society by internal warfare? How should the security and development compo-
nents of DDR programs be sequenced? Can DDR programs backfire and cause 
harm? Each of these questions is a rich area for research. This makes our work in 
this	review	in	some	ways	very	preliminary—the	more	each	area	is	explored	and	
the potential mechanisms linking DDR to specific elements of peacebuilding laid 
bare, the more it becomes apparent how many questions remained unanswered.
104 This uncertainty is perhaps the most overlooked yet important conclusion that 
should be on the minds of policy makers. With limited resources to devote to 
building post-conflict peace, it is important to take this uncertainty seriously 
and to promote systematic empirical research. The problem is not only one of 
how to most effectively allocate resources across a range of interventions. Studies 
of DDR programs’ substantive impacts must also be carried out to ensure that 
these programs do not have negative long-term consequences. To enable this, 
policy makers should insist, above all, that future programs be designed so that 
their effects on elements of peacebuilding can be evaluated scientifically.
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Krajina; Medak; Western Slavonia
FRUD
FMLN; RAES
Eritrean war of independence
Ideological; Tigrean
Communists, Indigenous




US/Coalition occupation; civil war




























































Table A.1: Civil Wars and Externally-Assisted DDR Programs, 1979–2006
The table continues on the next page.
Note: Wars are coded as of December 31, 2006. Peacebuilding outcomes are coded missing  
if the war was ongoing as of that date, or if observation of the outcome at the cut-off −2-year or 
5-year−was not possible as of December 2006; DDR is coded through December 31, 2009.
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SPLM; SPLA; NDA; Anya-Anya II
Darfur
Popular Democratic Army; UTO
NRA; etc.
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Table A.2: Civil Wars and DDR Programs Conducted without External Assistance,   
 Selected Cases
The table continues on the next page.
a ppe n di x
1. The DDR process in Afghanistan can be assigned to 
this war and to ongoing civil war (2001–present), as we 
do here.
2. The World Bank’s Emergency Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program (EDRP) ran from 1996-1999, 
and the follow-up Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment 
Project (PELRP) from 2001–2002. Thus there is a gap 
for 2000, during which PELRP was supposed to start 
but did not. The International Organization for Migra-
tion’s (IOM) Transitional Assistance Programme for  
Discharged Soldiers (TADS) ran from 2002–2006,  
followed by the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund 
(NTF) from 2006–2009.
3. Disarmament occurred during the 1997–2000 period 
under the auspices of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor 
the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) 
and then the UN Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINURCA). Some reintegration may have occurred. 
However efforts appear to have been suspended in the 
summer of 2000. DDR started again with the Central 
African Republic’s (CAR) program under the Multi-
Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
(MDRP) in 2004.
4. This refers to the same DDR program as that after the 
1980 to 1994 civil war in Chad.
5. Chad started a pilot reintegration program in January 
1999, which ran through 2000. Other sources report a 
reinsertion program scheduled for 2005–2010, but it 
appears never to have materialized.
6. Most sources date this phase of DDR in Colombia to 
2003, but it appears to have started in 2002. Interna-
tional community involvement may not date to the very 
beginning of this period.
7. DDR was interrupted for approximately one year, during 
2001.
8. Although DDR was originally scheduled to start in 2003, 
it appears to have stopped and started several times. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the program actually 
started in 2003, although there was a United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) program to demobilize child 
soldiers from 2003 to 2004. UN reports indicate that 
pre-cantonment started on May 22, 2006 and that this 
is considered the first step in implementing DDR, while 
the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) 
reports that the first disarmament of fighters occurred 
on July 27, 2006.
9. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern  
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) over-
saw the demilitarization of Serb forces its area of opera-
tions between late May and late June 1996, and ran a 
weapons buy-back program from October 2, 1996 
through August 19, 1997.
10. Much of the DDR process was completed in the 1992–
1993 period. However, a key reintegration component, 
the land transfer program, continued until 1997. Its work 
was almost complete in December 1996, with 250 cas-
es outstanding, having already completed 30,000.
11. The National Armed Forces for the Liberation of East 
Timor (FALINTIL) was demobilized between February 
and December 2001, but had been cantoned prior to 
that, in 2000. Reintegration programs ran through at 
least 2004.
12. DDR in Iraq has some similarities to other programs 
included in this table, but it has certainly not been a sus-
tained effort since 2003. We date it back that early due 
to a trial firearms amnesty and buy-back programs to 
carry out micro-disarmament. Starting in the spring of 
2009 at the latest, programs for Iraqis in the Anbar 
awakening militias which included training and reinser-







































a ppe n di x
13. Although militia disarmament was completed, with vary-
ing degrees of compliance, by April 31, 1991, integration 
of militia fighters into the Lebanese Army occurred in 
October 1993.
14. Although Maoist forces have been in cantonment since 
2007, progress on DDR was stalled during 2007 and 
most of 2008.
15. DDR was interrupted for at least six months (starting in 
January 1999), and for approximately one year, between 
May 2000 and May 2001.
16. Various programs that can be considered DDR have 
been going on in Somalia since 1993. The United 
Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNSOM I), the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNSOM II), and 
 the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) carried out disarma-
ment activities between 1993 and 1994; the European 
Commission (EC) and the Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) worked on DDR programs from 
1994-2004; the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) from 1999– 
Present; the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 1993-Present; and two DDR initiatives by 
Somali governments – one from 2000–2003 in South 
Somalia only, and a second from 2004–Present. Note 
that the ongoing programs were ongoing as of 2005.
17. The Interim DDR program for Sudan conducted by the 
UNDP appears not to have become fully operational 
until 2006, although it was financed and began to be 
staffed in 2005.
18. The MDRP DDR program in Uganda ended in 2007, but 
a follow-up program was created to last from 2008 to 
2010 (see World Bank 2008). Note also that although 
the MDRP started in Uganda in 2005, the Uganda 
Amnesty Commission, whose work it supports, has 
been in existence since 2000, so demobilization and 
reintegration activity during that period may have taken 
place. 
19. This refers to the same DDR program as that after the 
civil war from 1972 to 1979 in Zimbabwe.
20. Agência AngolaPress reports that demobilization of the 
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda 
(FLEC) ended on January 6, 2007. Reintegration 
appears to have continued past that date; specifics, 
however, are not readily available. An Angola Peace 
Monitor news report about ex-combatant dissatisfaction 
with the reintegration program confirms it was still on-
going as of February 29, 2008. The Agence France-
Presse (AFP) also reports in January 2010 that recipi-
ents of reintegration aid living in a community built espe-
cially for them expect new housing in the future.
21. The Independent International Commission on Decom-
missioning is joint between the Government of the UK 
and the Government of Ireland. Both countries have also 
passed laws granting individuals who handle arms in 
order to decommission them immunity from prosecution.
22. This refers to the decommissioning process in Northern 
Ireland, which started in December 1998 with Loyalist 
Volunteer Force’s decommissioning of some of its 
weapons. As of September 2005 the Irish Republican 
Army had fulfilled its obligations under the decommis-
sioning agreement, but to date full decommissioning of 
Loyalist paramilitary groups had not been completed.
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1.	 See,	 for	example,	Perez	(1986), Shaw (1984), Quandt (1972), Roy (1978),	Morrill	
(1972),	and	Matthews (1981).	These	authors	write	about	wide	range	of	contexts:	
the Roman Empire (Shaw); U.S.-occupied Cuba after the Spanish-American War 




2. For the civil war list, we use a version of Doyle and Sambanis (2006) updated through 
December 31, 2006. For reference we include in Table A.2 several other known 
instances	of	civil	war-related	DDR	programs	conducted	without	external	assistance,	
but prior to 1979. Note that only wars during the 1979–2006 period and which are 
not already in Table A.1 are numbered, to facilitate ease of reference to figures 
stated	in	the	text.	
3. World Bank (1993:2): “The World Bank is increasingly receiving requests by member 
governments for technical and/or financial assistance for programs to reintegrate 
demobilized combatants and displaced persons into the economy.”
4. Principal studies from this period include World Bank (1993, 1996), Azam, et. al. 
(1994), Coelho and Vines (1994), Berdal (1996), Clark (1996), Colletta, et. al. (1996a, 
1996b),	Ejigu	and	Gedamu	(1996),	Laurance	and	Meek	(1996), UN (1996), Kingma 
(1997), Spencer (1997), Dercon and Ayalew (1998), and Kreimer, et. al. (1998).
5. Berdal and Ucko (2009:2),	for	example,	quoting	UNSC	(2000), note that “[a] meas-
ure of success in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of com-
batants came to be recognized—and still is—as perhaps the single most important 
precondition	for	post-war	stability	and,	by	extension,	for	more	ambitious	attempts	
to facilitate ‘a society’s transition from conflict to normalcy and development,’” 
i.e., achieving long-term economic development and growth.
 6.	 These	are	the	conclusions	of	a	report	by	the	Praxis	Group	(2000), drawing on a 
series of interviews with UN staff, donors, NGOs, academics and others on the 
topic of DDR program effectiveness. 
7. A good assessment of the economy, including an assessment of which sectors can 
absorb	ex-combatants	joining	the	labor	force,	can	help	with	the	design	of	reinte-
gration programs (Arthy 2003).
8. Delays in demobilization can lead to mutinies by former combatants who lose 
trust in the process. For a discussion of problems associated with such delays in 
the cases of the DDR programs in South Africa and Namibia, see Griffiths (1996). 
en dnot es
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Delays, however, can be handled if sufficient support is given to the program and 
if	peacekeeping	assistance	is	available.	In	Mozambique,	a	case	generally	considered	
a success in demobilization, all troops were supposed to have been demobilized 
120 days after election day, but one year after the signing of the cease-fire agreement 
in 1992, no troops had been demobilized (see Jett 2000).
9.	 A	recent	source	that	integrates	lessons	learned	from	different	programs	is	Meek	
and	Malan	 (2004). Their conclusions follow much of the policy literature that 
highlights the need for better coordination at the planning stage, better linkage of 
the two steps of the process (i.e., linking reintegration better to disarmament and 
demobilization),	improving	the	articulation	of	objectives	for	the	DDR	program,	and	
managing the distribution of resources so as to reduce inequities between the assist-
ance offered to DDR program participants and the rest of the community.
10. The UN’s Integrated DDR Standards also reflect the understanding that DDR 
programs should promote security as a means of enabling comprehensive peace-
building: “DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can, however, 
help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a peace-building 
strategy, including weapons management, security sector reform, elections and 
rule of law reform, can proceed.” (UN IDDRS [2006] 2.10 “The UN Approach to 
DDR”: §3). The UN also conceives of DDR as both part of a multi-dimensional 
peacebuilding process and multi-dimensional in and of itself: “The aim of the 
DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations 
so	that	recovery	and	development	can	begin.	The	DDR	of	ex-combatants	is	a	com-
plex	process,	with	political,	military,	security,	humanitarian	and	socio-economic	
dimensions” (UN IDDRS [2006] 2.10: §4).
11. One challenge DDR programs face is that in providing economic reintegration 
assistance	 to	 ex-combatants,	 and	 fairly	 uniform	 assistance	 packages	 (although	
typically officers receive larger amounts of assistance than enlisted personnel), it 
may	be	difficult	to	completely	compensate	individuals	who	profited	extensively	
from the war, who could act as spoilers if they believe that they are not doing well 
economically under the peace. Although directly addressing this issue appears to 
be outside the scope of DDR programs, presumably if DDR and other post-con-
flict assistance programs had fast-acting positive effects at the macro-level, these 
individuals could end up satisfied (see Carbonnier 1998:47). 
12. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is a widely cited paper promoting this view. See, how-
ever, Berman et. al. (2009), who show that in the Philippines and Iraq unemploy-
ment is negatively correlated with insurgent attacks on government forces and 
unrelated to attacks on civilians. Fearon (2007) questions the basis for the oppor-
tunity	cost	argument	in	a	formal	model.	Chassang	and	Padró	i	Miquel	(2009)	also	
argue that the opportunity cost argument is based on faulty logic, since if income 
is high, opportunity costs of violence would be high, but so too would the spoils 
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of war. These authors consider recent empirical evidence that negative economic 
shocks increase the risk of war and the claim that this relationship confirms the 
opportunity cost theory of civil war. Negative economic shocks might increase 
the risk of war because even though they reduce the present value of spoils from 
war and depress rebel “wages”, the prospects of future returns from victory after 
the negative shock has passed are high, thereby encouraging rebellion before the 
recovery from the shock.  Nevertheless, that view also has some logical flaws, as it 
does	not	explain	why	potential	rebels	are	not	concerned	about	their	future	earn-
ings (after the shock) and the risk that participation in rebellion today poses to 
realizing those earnings.
13.	 Micro-disarmament	also	has	economic	consequences,	as	it	reduces	the	reliance	on	
small arms as sources of income. If employment opportunities are limited, former 
combatants will be more reluctant to surrender their weapons since they can use 
them	 for	 income.	 See,	 for	 example,	 reports	of	 a	market	 for	 renting	weapons	 in	
Mozambique	referenced	by	Pike	and	Taylor	[2000:16]. 
14. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2002). The role of formal and informal networks 
of	 ex-combatants	 in	 postwar	 countries	 has	 not	 been	 studied	 extensively.	 The	
assumption seems to be that such networks pose a threat to the peace. “Delinking” 
is often used as a measure of success of DDR programs (see Humphreys and Wein-
stein 2006). However, the effects of such networks is ambiguous. They may facil-
itate mobilization in the event of a return to war; or they can contribute to the 
peace, if they facilitate the social reintegration of former fighters. The question is 
worthy of further research. 
15.	 See,	for	example,	Kingma	(2002). 
16. See Gleichman et. al. (2004:17) and Ball and van de Goor (2006:4).
17. See also Walter (2004), who emphasizes the importance of conditions in the imme-
diate post-war period, looking at the breakdown of peace as essentially similar to 
a new outbreak of civil war.
18. Assessing the effect of military integration agreements (integrating former rebels 
into the government military) is complicated by the fact that such agreements are 
often not implemented where they are most needed to provide a self-enforcing 
mechanism for the implementation of terms of a peace agreement. For a discussion, 
see Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008). 
19. Labeling acts of rebellion “banditry” in order to de-legitimize them was a com-
mon technique of early twentieth century Chinese government officials (Billings-
ley 1988:9–10): “In China, as throughout the rest of the world, the word ‘bandit’ 
has traditionally been the most useful one for discrediting political enemies, 
whether of the older kind (popular rebels) or the new (Republicans and Commu-
nists). The word suggests strong-armed, recalcitrant, antisocial individuals engaged 
in a futile personal vendetta against all and sundry, lacking even the would-be 
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legitimacy	of	heterodox	ideology	[…].	To	the	framers	of	the	law,	the	police,	and	all	
those with a modicum of power, this image provided the ideal means of drawing 
attention away from any genuine peasant grievances bandits might present, and of 
defaming or belittling political adversaries. The word ‘banditry,’ that is, could be 
used to subsume the whole range of stealing…from petty thieving to political rev-
olution —and the effect was to tar all those to whom the term was applied with 
the same brush.” Reframing of post-war violence as criminal, banditry, may have 
a similar goal.
20. See Becker (1968) for a foundational article in this line of inquiry.
21.	 See,	for	example,	Witte	(1980), Cornwell and Trumbull (1994),	Miron (2001), Can-
tor and Land (1985), Tyler (2004), and Rosenfeld (2009). One point of agreement 
that has emerged in the literature is the correlation between the prohibition of 
drugs and increased violent crime (Dills et. al. 2008).
22. See Constable (1992), Beresford (1994), SAPA (1994), DPA(1997), Star Radio (1998), 
Jakarta Post (2008), and IRIN (2009a).
23.	 A	rare,	more	direct	test	of	the	effects	of	DDR	appears	in	Restrepo	and	Muggah	
(2009). Their data on homicides, robberies, and assaults in paramilitary groups’ 
areas of operation suggests that disarmament and demobilization had a significant 
negative	effect	on	those	three	categories	of	crime.	On	average,	for	example,	homi-
cides fell roughly 13 percent. It is important to note, however, that the ongoing 
war in Colombia may make these findings less relevant to the concerns of DDR 
practitioners in post-conflict settings. A declining homicide rate might simply be 
indicative of portions of the war itself being brought to an end, rather than being 
a	result	of	DDR.	Note,	too,	that	Restrepo	and	Muggah	find	that	the	effect	fades	
considerably over time. 
24. See Stanley and Call (1997:119–20), who make this point quite clear in their dis-
cussion of police reform in post-conflict El Salvador.
25. This appears to be a case of what Parker (2001:715) calls “the failure to draw appro-
priate policy conclusions from methodologically sound findings on controversial 
subjects	such	as	gun	control.”
26.	 This	is	Galtung’s	concept	of	“positive	peace”	as	“social	justice.”	See	Galtung	(1969, 
1981, 2005). There is, however, some disagreement as to whether the absence of 
war is properly understood as a minimal condition and whether the elements of 
self-sustaining peace are as normatively positive as claimed by proponents. See 
Boulding (1977).
27. Boutros-Ghali defines peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures 
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict” (1992:6).
28. Abstractly, the literatures in economics and political science on the welfare-
enhancing	effects	of	markets	and	democratic	institutions	are	examples.
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29. Doyle and Sambanis refer to this as “participatory peace.”
30. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992:16), key peacebuilding activities include: “dis-
arming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody 
and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training 
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect 
human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promot-
ing formal and informal processes of political participation” [emphasis added].
31. Antonio Navarro Wolff, quoted in Chernick (1994).
32. Guáqueta (2009)	contrasts	the	example	of	the	political	incorporation	of	the	M-19	
in Colombia in the early 1990s with the case of the paramilitaries from roughly 
2002 on.
33.	 Torjesen	makes	reference	to	the	example	of	Tajikistan,	but	notes	more	pessimisti-
cally that this type of stake-holding could entrench underdevelopment and insta-
bility over the long run (2006:17).





becoming engaged in violence. See also Lumsden (1997) on cycles of violence, and, 
more	generally,	Miguel	et.	al.	(2009)	on	exposure	to	civil	war	violence	leading	to	
future violent behavior by non-combatants.
37. Colletta et. al. (1996b:276) discuss the manifestation of these problems in Uganda: 
“Lastly, and frequently, veterans would find reintegration and community accept-
ance	easier	when	they	were	accepted	by	the	extended	family.	If	the	extended	fam-
ily provided food and shelter, nursed the children, and took care of the sick, the 
community would normally show greater and quicker sympathy with the return-
ee; however, many veterans lost their entire family, had their houses burned down, 
and/or their economic base destroyed during the civil war and, thus, had no 
‘home’ to which they could return. In these cases, reintegration also proved a for-
midable psychological challenge.”
38. Fontana and Rosenheck (2005)	isolate	the	effects	of	“traumatic	military	exposure	
[including	witnessing	and	perpetrating	violence]	and	a	rejecting	and	non-supportive	
homecoming reception” as operating through PTSD. PTSD is associated with 
post-war antisocial behaviors, although trauma and difficult returns do not appear 
to affect such behavior independently. Importantly, post-war antisocial behavior 
is	 significantly	 linked	 to	pre-war	antisocial	behavior.	For	a	 recent	 example,	 see	
Smith (2009)	and	USACHPPM	(2009) on a series of homicides at a U.S. Army 
base in Colorado allegedly perpetrated by three soldiers who were in the process 
of being discharged. 
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39.	 The	examples	of	veterans	of	the	People’s	Liberation	Army	of	Namibia	(PLAN),	
which fought against South Africa for independence and won and Namibian vet-
erans of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), who fought with the 
South Africans in the counterinsurgency against the Namibian independence 
movement,	are	illustrative:	“Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	PLAN	ex-combatants	
know that they helped bring about independence many have little knowledge of how 
to give themselves a purpose in life or how to take initiatives toward self-sufficiency. 
SWATF	ex-combatants	bear	the	guilt	of	having	fought	for	the	vanquished	foreign	
oppressor. Often they are ashamed and shy and are ostracized in many communi-
ties. (Colletta et. al. [1996b:13]).”
40. Colletta et. al. (1996b:280) note that this also happens indirectly, as with wives of 
ex-combatants	in	Uganda,	some	of	whom	“had	married	a	soldier	for	the	perceived	
special status. These women resent a return to civilian life as they see their social 
status diminish or vanish.”
41. This applies principally to gender roles and to age- and gender-based hierarchies 
of authority. See, e.g., Colletta et. al. (1996b:13, 79, 280)	on	female	ex-combatants	
in Namibia, Ethiopia, and Uganda.
42. See DelVecchio Good et. al. (2007:24) for a rather comprehensive list of types of 
trauma	experienced	across	a	population	exposed	to	civil	war,	in	a	study	of	Aceh,	
Indonesia.	Examples	include	being	forced	to	injure	or	betray	family	and	others,	
being forced to provide food or shelter to armed groups, being forced to fight, 
being punished for not fighting, varieties of physical deprivation, and psychic 
traumas like being forced to search for corpses or being prevented from carrying 
out proper religious burials.
43.	 The	conflict	between	ex-combatants	and	civilians	is	also	one	of	the	main	obstacles	to	
resettlement and reintegration. Colletta et. al. (1996b:79) observed the “formidable 
psychological and social challenge” that comes from “[r]esentment between ‘victim’ 
and ‘culprit’” in Ethiopia.
44. Colletta et. al. (1996b:78) recognize the need for counseling particularly for child 
combatants but note that this is not always provided in DDR programs (e.g., in 
Ethiopia). 
45. Neuner and Elbert (2007) write: “Ironically, arguments about the cultural difference 
between countries has [sic] been primarily raised by European or North Ameri-
can	‘experts’	with	the	intention	of	protecting	the	poor	in	the	developing	countries	
from the West, or more precisely from its educated scientists and clinicians. Upon 
closer	examination	this	appears	to	be	a	colonial	perspective.”
46.	 Recent	examples	that	work	hard	to	disentangle	alternative	explanations	within	the	
economic	 causes	 of	 conflict	 framework	 include	 Chassang	 and	 Padró	 i	Miquel	
(2009) and Hegre et. al. (2009).
57
e n dnot e s
47. This assumes that each combatant had one weapon. Conceivably the rate of disar-
mament could be much lower if combatants had more than one weapon.
48. The emphasis on prioritization of security concerns in SIDDR (2006) reflects this.
49.	 For	an	example	of	such	an	argument,	see	Spear	(2002:141): “Peace requires break-
ing the command and control structures operating over rebel fighters – thus mak-
ing it more difficult for them to return to organized armed rebellion – and reform-
ing or integrating new state armies to act in the interest of the entire citizenry.”
50. This is potentially mitigated by perceptions of specific armed groups among the 
civilian population. If a group is seen as having represented or defended the com-
munity,	civilians	may	be	more	likely	to	view	the	ex-combatant	DDR	benefits	as	
just	compensation	for	patriotic	services	rendered.
51. Hoffman (2004)	explains	the	motivations	of	Sierra	Leonean	kamajor militia mem-
bers who, post-conflict, moved on to fight in Liberia, and their actions there. 
Debos (2008) discusses the role of Chadian former combatants in civil war in the 
Central African Republic.
52. According to some estimates, the DDR program in Sierra Leone involved 87% of 
all	ex-combatants	 (Humphreys	and	Weinstein	2004:30), although it is not clear 
whether these individuals went through all stages of DDR. Knowing the nation-
wide rate of participation in DDR by stage is important as statistics for the pro-
gram	clearly	indicate	attrition.	Approximately	22.7%	of	ex-combatants	who	were	
disarmed did not continue and enter the reintegration component (56,751 of the 
72,490 did). See World Bank (2003:9). Other estimates flag the possibility that the 
DDR participation rate was much lower, possibly as low as 52.6% participation in 
the disarmament stage and 41.2% in reintegration, based on the estimate of a total 
of 137,865	 ex-combatants	 (McKay	 and	Mazurana	 2004:92). Even assuming the 
high rate of participation (87%), it would be informative to know the employment 
outcomes	of	ex-combatants	who	did	not	go	through	DDR,	to	confirm	whether	
DDR	 can	 be	 said	 to	 help	 ex-combatants’	 chance	 of	 employment,	 although	 the	
comparison would be marred by non-random selection into the DDR program.
53. At first glance, if all demobilized soldiers participated in the program, the com-
parison is no longer possible. However, since the program was implemented in 
phases, it may have been possible to make these comparisons. The employment 
outcomes of 5,000 soldiers who went through a pilot program (World Bank 2009a:40), 
for	 example,	 could	be	 compared	 to	 those	of	other	 soldiers	prior	 to	 their	parti-
cipation in the program, even if all were eventually beneficiaries of the economic 
reintegration elements of it. This would be particularly valuable if participants in 
the pilot program were randomly selected, although the report gives no informa-
tion about the selection criteria used. Still, the validity of such a comparison could be 
questioned, given that success of a very limited program might not indicate whether 
a scaled-up version would produce the same benefits. 
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54. Darden (2009)	demonstrates	the	importance	of	the	content	of	pre-existing	social	
networks for mobilizing violent action in his study of the role of nationalist net-
works in the growth of Ukrainian armed opposition to Soviet occupation during 
and	following	World	War	II.	He	exploits	a	natural	experiment	research	design	to	
establish	the	exogenous	origins	of	the	nationalist	content	of	the	networks	in	19th	
century schooling patterns, showing that dense social ties alone do not predict 
mobilization.
55. In their study of DDR in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007, 2009) 
find	no	significant	effect	of	DDR	on	ex-combatants’	 severing	of	 ties	with	 their	
wartime	comrades,	in	a	survey	of	ex-combatants.	The	extent	of	continuing	ties	is	
measured using responses to questions about with whom respondents spend time, 
with whom they would prefer to start a business, and to whom they would turn if 
faced with a problem. A World Bank (2003) study of DDR outcomes in Sierra 
Leone	does	not	examine	any	such	indicator.	
56. See Colletta et. al. (1996b), who give crime statistics for DDR program partici-
pants in Uganda. They also consider divorce rates and landlessness as measures of 
success/failure of the reintegration of former combatants. 
57. Along similar lines, Vinck et. al. (2007) show that mental distress resulting from 
exposure	to	wartime	violence	can	cause	individuals	to	seek	retributive	solutions	to	
conflict.
58. Parsons (1963:57) views legitimacy as “the higher normative defense against the 
breakdown of a system of social order.” Others writing about the link between 
legitimacy and stability include Huntingon (1968), who emphasizes the destabilizing 
effect of changes in the legitimacy of a regime; Englebert (2002), who shows the 
influence	of	legitimacy	on	the	development	trajectories	of	African	countries,	espe-
cially through its effects on stability; and Gurr (1968), who posits that legitimacy 
can mitigate the effects of instability-causing factors. See also Lipset (1959) for a 
discussion of the relationship between legitimacy and stability following crises, 
and	Muller	(1972) on legitimacy and the potential for anti-government violence.
59. Compilations of case studies of DDR programs often raise the issue of unit hetero-
geneity—in	this	context,	heterogeneity	across	the	post-conflict	situations	in	which	
DDR programs operate (see, e.g., Berdal and Ucko 2009).
60. This does not take into account inflation.
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Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs are 
a policy instrument that has been increasingly used by the international community 
to	secure	the	peace	in	post-conflict	contexts.	This	report	provides	a	social-scientific	
review of these programs. It summarizes the research questions that policy makers 
and academics pose about DDR programs’ ability to achieve their goals and how 
program implementation may factor into this. It reviews the policy and academic 
literatures on DDR and takes stock of where research in this field stands to date. 
The report then addresses how claims about effects of DDR programs can be 
evaluated. It highlights the appropriate data and methods and the questions that 
may be inherently difficult to answer. The report concludes with an agenda for 
future research and the critical role that policy makers can play.
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